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FOREWORD -*1 
J. Gueron 
"Start, finish, publish". These three imperatives, 
said to be Faraday's advice to scientists, apply to any 
activity, abstract or technological, especially where public 
funds and a large number of workers are involved. 
Were the ORGEL Project, and the various consecutive 
operations comprised in it, well started as to their concep-
tion and the decision taken? 
Was its termination well justified, expedient, 
logical, serene? 
Whatever the answers may be, it was necessary to 
publish a study (in addition to the great number of essen-
tially technical reports and articles) to bring into per-
spective the multiple technical, political and structural 
factors whose nature and interaction formed the inseparable 
essence of the project. 
Like any other adventure or undertaking, ORGi]L had 
its supporters and its adversaries, its friends and enemies; 
the intense passions it aroused would be astonishing were it 
not well known that passions depict the people who feel them 
far more than the object they are centred on. 
*) Manuscript received on March 15 1971 
But this is neither the time nor the place to 
assign praise or blame; that must be done from the distance 
of years - and who will give a thought to ORGEL in twenty 
or thirty years' time? 
The purpose here is to tell the history of an 
enterprise and to draw certain lessons from it. At my 
insistence the Director of the ORGEL Project and his 
principal co-workers have performed this task and, in my 
opinion, have made an excellent job of it. 
The technical report gives a clear account of 
the initial options and the way both they and the design 
studies and solutions progressed. 
The complex interplay of all the different deci-
sion factors is also described with clarity and without 
any omissions or distortions. 
Admittedly these last words suggest a judgment not 
based on a twenty years' perspective; but they really express, 
rather my involvement alongside men who, with me and under 
my responsibility, worked so well for ten years and who, 
in writing the following pages, have yet again carried out 
their twofold job as European civil servants and as nuclear 
engineers. 
October I969 
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INTRODUCTION 
In June I969 the Commission of the European 
Communities decided to put a full stop to the ORGEL Project, 
just at the moment when its logical sequel would have led 
to the early construction, in the Community, first of all 
of a large-scale prototype and then of a series of nuclear 
power plants. 
In view of the hopes originally placed in this 
project, the sums expended to develop it, and the achieve-
ments it produced, we think it would be useful to sum up 
its history and draw some conclusions therefrom. 
As regards the technical aspects, the ORGEL Project 
was the subject of a great many reports in the course of 
1 ten years, which are still available for reference . We 
shall therefore confine ourselves to giving, in an Annex 
to this report, a summary review of the main technical 
options adontnrl as guidelines for the research programme. 
Short Bibliography, pp. ku-30 
1. Conditions governing the choice of a heavy-
water reactor for the Community programme 
The nuclear energy scene in 1959 could be described 
by three factors - the economic, depending on the 
cost evaluated in terms of different energy sources; the 
political and military, dominated by the urge for independence 
in the civil field as well as in the production of military 
explosives; and the "provident management" factor, determined 
by concern to make the best use of the natural resources. 
1.1 The estimates of the period show that the economic 
factor was favourable to heavy water reactors, though 
not overwhelmingly so, in several countries including France, 
West Germany and Canada, but unfavourable to them in the 
United States, where there were uranium enrichment plants 
already in operation and financial conditions propitious to 
1 light-water reactors . 
1.2 Outside the United States, the military and political 
factor lay on the side of the natural uranium reac-
tors. But if the Community introduced heavy-water reactors on 
the industrial scale it would have to build heavy-water 
manufacturing plants, unless it relied on American production. 
1 
First, the high price of money militated in favour 
of reactors such as the PWR, which required moderate 
capital investment; secondly, the USAEC, by leasing 
enriched uranium at the rate of h% enabled the fuel 
cycle of enriched-uranium reactors to avoid the high 
rate of interest charged on normal borrowings. 
3 -
The Canadians, who were not troubled by the 
-1 
dependence , directed (and are still directing) their 
attention almost exclusively to heavy-water reactors. In 
Europe, on the contrary, France and Britain launched out, 
as early as 1(j!32, into a vigorous programme of natural 
uranium/^raphite-moderated reactors. Nonetheless, the 
economic potential of the heavy-water reactors, theoreti-
cally higher than that of the graphite reactors, warranted 
further work on heavy-water systems. France therefore tackled 
2 this line, starting work on the EL-'l· series , as did hest 
Ger:..any, where the construction of the Karlsruhe "Kehrzweck" 
reactor was put in hand. 
1 .3 The "provident management" factor never played a 
decisive role, but it favours the heavy-water 
reactors, .;s numerous Canadian publications have shown 
(W.B. Lewis, "Low Cost Fuelling without Recycling" - 2ECL 
3¿2 - "Heavy hater Reactor Review and Prospect" - AECL 
277^, etc.). 
At that time. Siice 1S66 they have had to build 
several heavy-water manufacturing plants in order 
to sustain the industrial growth of their reactor 
syst on'. 
A heavy-water moderated reactor cooled with carbon 
dioxide in pressure tubes. 
A reactor moderated and cooled with heavy water 
in a steel nressure vessel. 
In all these circumstances, therefore, it was 
reasonable to incline towards a heavy-water moderated, 
natural uranium fuelled reactor as the target of a pro-
gramme designed to promote a Community system of nuclear 
1 power plants . 
2. Conditions governing the choice of the 
ORGEL variant 
2.1 Owing to the re.arkable moderating "properties of 
heavy water, there was a great temptation to build 
reactors moderated with this liquid and capable of using 
natural.uranium fuel, and in fact many heavy_water reactors 
were constructed either for research purposes (NRX, ZOE, 
NRU, etc.) in the early days of nuclear energy, or as 
plutonium and/or tritium breeding reactors (Savannah River 
and, later on, Marcoule). But in order to produce electricity 
it was necessary to raise the temperature of the heavy 
water, i.e., to pressurize it and to refuel during operation 
so as to extract sufficient energy from the natural uranium 
to keep the fuel consumption costs low; tne:je two charac-
teristics make for design problems, particularly as regards 
circuit leaktightness and the consequences of any leaks 
that may occur. 
1 
The foregoing reasoning is extremely qualitative. 
As far as we know, more quantitative assessments 
were not done on the subject and would, in fact, 
have been difficult in view of the subjective 
nature of certa.in major parameters. 
- 5 
As a result the engineers in concerns interested 
in heavy-water reactors addressed themselves to discovering 
ways of utilizing the good moderating qualities of heavy 
water whilst suppressing its failings as a coolant. They 
found a solution, namely, to separate the moderator and 
cooling circuits and to use another coolant, more manageable 
than the heavy water. 
Four were studied - sodium, light water, carbon 
dioxide and the organic coolants. In 1958-59 these various 
versions of heavy-water reactors were the subject of design 
studies soi.e of which (e.g., the organic variant) were 
reported on at the Second Geneva Conference (1958). The 
organic-cooled variant had been considered in several 
places (Canada, France, Denmark, Spain) and its prospects 
had been considered attractive. 
2.2 At that tine the First Five-Year Programme for the 
nascent European Atomic Energy Community was being 
1 discussed among the competent authorities . One of the 
objectives of that Institution was to evolve a reactor 
system which would be developed in such a manner as to 
become the property of the Community. The system was more-
over, to form the "backbone" of the Euratom Joint Research 
Centre, then being set up. 
1 
Only the outline budget and general trends of this 
programme were defined in Annex V of the Euratom 
Treaty. 
6-
As we have seen, the environment prompted the 
choice of a heavy v/ater, natural uranium fuelled reactor 
system. Research had recently started on two variants of 
this system inside the Community - the CO -cooled variant 
under study by the French CEA, and the heavy-water-cooled 
variant in a pressure vessel, being studied by Siemens on 
behalf of the West German Ministry of Research. 
Euratom sought to pool the Community countries' 
efforts and centre them on a single variant which could 
have been developed in the Euratom framework in cooperatio: 
with the Community Member States. An agreement for cooper-
ation with Canada (p. 27, Section 7.1) was negotiated and 
this would have enabled all the organizations engaged on 
heavy-water research with substantial funds to combine their 
efforts. But this attempt, which if successful could have 
appreciably, if not radically, altered the future of the 
heavy-water reactors and of the atomic energy Community, 
ended in failure. 
The Scientific and Technical Committee suggested, 
and the Council decided, on a proposal from the Commission, 
that Euratom should develop ORGEL, which was a promising 
2 
variant though different from the ones .studied in France 
and Germany. The two countries reacted differently. In 
France, Euratom's commitment to a path of which the CEA 
had already explored certain aspects was approved. 
1 
A body set up under the terms of the Treaty to advise the 
Commission on programmes. It consists of 20 leading in-
dustrial and specific figures from the Six countries, 
appointed in their personal capacity. 
2 
In view of the importance of this point, we reproduce in 
Annex 2 (pp. 91-93) the relevant extracts from the Com-
mission's communication to the Council concerning its 
programme. 
7-
In Germany, industry argued that an institution using 
public funds had no right to handle the development of 
reactors intended for power production. This fact was 
probably the underlying cause of the reserve the West 
German government always displayed towards ORGEL - a 
reserve which turned to opposition as the years went by. 
3. The technical attractions of ORGEL 
Generally sneaking, natural uranium fuelled reac-
tors feature a high capital cost and a low fuel 
cycle cost. Hence anything that can bring down the capital 
cost is worth investigating, such as, in the case of heavy-
water reactors, the use of an organic fluid instead of heavy 
water as coolant. With such a substance it is generally 
speaking possible to operate at low pressure (less than 
20 atmosphere) and use cheap materials (aluminium, mild 
steel). Furthermore, it is reputed to undergo little acti-
vation, and this should simplify the shielding problems. 
In fact, the promoters of organic cooling hoped, in 1958, 
to apply· to reactors the techniques and materials in use 
in the oil industry. 
In the Annex to this report summarizing the 
technical projects undertaken to develop ORGEL, the reader 
will see in some detail how sound or optimistic these 
initial assumptions were. 
Be that as it may, the potential of the 0RGEL-
type reactors was assessed several times after 1958, not 
only at Euratom but in Canada and the United States as 
well» 
­8 
The findings were always highly promising, and it 
η was this that in 196^ decided the USAEC to go ahead with 
the heavy­water organic­cooled reactor, which was given 
a vigorous launching (p. 30, Sections 7·5 and 7.6). 
2 
Again in May I969 the AECL , through its Senior 
Vice­President, stressed the very high potential offered 
3 
by the organic­cooled heavy­water reactor . This conclusion 
if was shared by the European industrial group which, in 
December 1968, had submitted a 250 MWe ORGEL reactor design 
to the Commission of the European Communities, in response 
to the Commission's invitation to tender (p. 39, Section 9)< 
It can thus be said that ORGEL's technical poten­
tial was and still is good, and that from this point of 
view the 1958 choice was well founded. But that potential 
could be exploited only on one vital condition ­ i.e., very 
rapid development, which meant resolute and effective sup­
port within the Community institutions and on the part of 
the Member States. 
1 
United States Atomic Energy Commission 
2 
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd 
3 
Nucleonics Week, 19 June I969 
¿f 
GAAA­Interatom­Kontedison 
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¿f. ORGEL - The intrinsic development context 
k,"\ The project's first handicap was that it was born 
at the same time as the organization which had to 
manage it. The process of recruiting 2500 people of dif-
ferent nationalities and setting up working structures, in 
a context where no precedent existed, gave rise to quite 
1 
understandable hesitations , which were worsened by the 
delays in ratifying the agreement to transfer the Ispra 
Establishment to the Community; it was not ratified until 
19 July i960, several months behind schedule. 
M-.2 Another handicap lay in the way the Project was 
to be developed. It should have been organized 
with the single purpose of reac' ing the goal in the shortest 
possible time, backed by the best resources available any-
2 where in the Community ; instead, it had to provide the 
newly created Ispra Centre with a focus for action and 
give it priority in the design studies. In return, the 
Ispra Centre was supposed to devote its best efforts to 
the Project . But it took a long time to get the labora-
tories going, and although some of them wanted to establish 
their competency in regard to ORGEL, others preferred to 
1 
Which it was hoped, however, would be offset by 
the enthusiasm of combined technical and political 
creation. 
2 
Which, at that time, would assuredly not have been 
up to the job. 
3 
For this purpose the project had been assigned part 
of the equipment funds, which enabled it to bring 
financial influence, as well, to bear on the Centre's 
line of development. 
-10-
take a very general line. 
4.3 The Project Management ought to have been able to 
balance things by contracting work out to private 
or public Community laboratories, as it had had to do at 
the outset of the Project when the Ispra Centre did not 
1 exist. But by I96I the theory of "fair return" had 
emerged and now had to be applied, not simply within the 
overall Euratom budget, but actually in each separate 
project. An administrative procedure set up in July I962 
turned the awarding of contracts into an enormously lengthy 
process. 
Then, from 1964 onwards, matters came to the 
point where the sums to be spent by the Project on research 
at the Ispra Establishment and those it could allot to 
research and development contracts had to be entered under 
2 
different budget heads ; the R&D contracts were gradually 
chiselled away and then stopped completely. Throughout 
1 To the effect that each State should get back the 
equivalent of its contribution to the Euratom 
budget. 
In the Euratom Research and Investment Budget, the 
budget head under which the ORGEL Project was en-
tered bore the number 43. In I963 the head was 
divided into two sections: Section 430, which 
covered the construction of the ECO and ESSOR reac-
tors, and Section 431, covering the research con-
nected with development of the Project. From 1964 
onwards Section 431 was subdivided into two items: 
4311 entitled "Contract research", and 4312 entitled 
"Own research". 
- 11 -
this process the technical aspects failed to receive 
the attention they deserved. 
5. Aims and achievements 
"The ORGEL Project consists in the 
whole set of studies preliminary 
to the construction of a proto-
type heavy-water moderated, 
organic-liquid cooled reactor". 
Such was the definition bestowed on this Project 
at the outset of I960. 
5.1 Nine years went by, down to the recent decision 
to step the Project; during that time a research 
infrastructure was laid, numerous experimental circuits 
were built and operated, materials were developed up to 
1 
the pre-industrial production stage , technological as-
semblies were perfected; a research reactor for the study 
1 
E.g., SAP pressure tuoes and claddings, uranium 
carbide (see Annex). 
12 
1 of heavy­water lattices was built (ECO) , likewise a huge 
2 complex for testing channel sub­assemblies (comprising a 
reactor and two high­activity laboratories) (ESSOR)1 . 
5.2 Fig. 1 shows the growth in the numbers of Com­
mission personnel who worked on the Project. It 
will be observed that at the height of activity, in 1965­66, 
a little over four hundred people, or 35/¿» of the Ispra 
Establishment were working on the ORGEL Project. In all, 
the manpower devoted by the Commission itself to this 
4 Project can be estimated at 4,000 man­years . 
5.3 The sum earmarked for the programme under head 43, 
entitled "Organic reactors", in the Euratom Research 
and Investment Budget, was approximately 17.5 million u.a. 
for the First and 64 million u.a. for the Second Five­Year 
Programme; 1.7 million u.a. were added for i960. These sums 
do not include the cost of the staff used on the Project by 
the Commission, or the fraction of Euratom's general running 
costs which related to the Project; these costs are entered, 
1 
Orgel Critical Experiment 
2 
The name given to the assembly composed of a calandria 
tube and a pressure tube containing the fuel in the 
coolant flow line. 
■A 
ESSai ORgel (Orgel test) 
¿f 
To find the total manpower devoted to the Project one 
must, of course, add the far greater volume contributed 
by industrial firms during the construction of ECO and 
ESSOR, and by the various research organizations that 
worked under ORGEL contracts. 
13 
though not itemized, in another part of the budget. Out of 
the "3.2 million u.a. of investment and research appropria-
tions, the ESSOR complex, including studies, accounted for 
45 million and ECO for 5 million u.a. 
The remaining 33 million u.a. went to the research 
programme, to be shared between the activities carried out in 
the Commission's laboratories and those put out to contract. 
Fig. 2 shows the change in the ratio of these sums over the 
years; the continual drop in the contract work (the reasons 
for which were given on p. 10, Section 4.3) is clearly 
evident, as is the fact that the "Own research" credits 
were very substantial in I96I-62, the period of fitting 
out the Ispra laboratories, which were very largely financed 
with the Project appropriations. 
It is difficult to determine the exact total cost 
f the ORGEL Project, for want of a central analytical ac-
counting system. If the estimate of 4,000 man-years, men-
tioned above for the Commission's manpower expenditure on 
the Project, is accepted as a fairly realistic figure, the 
cost of the personnel and related running expenses should 
be assessed at about 60 million u.a., which would bring the 
total cost of the operation up to 143 million u.a. So for 
want of a more exact figure we can estimate that total 
spending on the ORGEL Project in ten years amounted to I50 
million u.a. at the outside. 
o 
Comparisons in this field are very difficult because, 
even where the bodies concerned - public or private - give 
overall figures, these may include ancillary expenditure 
(contribution to a centre's equipment, special laboratories, 
etc.) varying widely from case to case. 
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Here are some examples, for guidance purposes: 
(a) The Dragon project, in eleven years up to 31 March 1970, 
cost £31.25 million. This sum comprises all expenditure, 
including the building and operation of the Dragon 
reactor, and the services supplied to the project by 
the Winfrith centre (general services, use of Zenith 
reactor). On the other hand, the project made no con-
tribution to the expenditure on infrastructure and 
general equipment of the centre. At the current rate 
this sum is equivalent to 76 million u.a. If the 
variations in exchange rates during the life of the 
project were taken into account, it would be more than 
90 million u.a. 
(b) The development of the AGR and of its short-term improve-
ments amounts to £110 million, or roughly 300 million u.a., 
whilst for all the advanced versions of the AGR and the 
SGHWR together, the total up to 31 March I968 was quoted 
as £600 million or, calculated on the same basis as for 
Dragon, I7OO million u.a. ("Journal of the British 
Nuclear Energy Society", January I969)· 
(c) As to the fast reactors: 
(i) The German studies (Euratom Association) cost, 
from I960 to the end of I967, about 75 million 
u.a., but they did not include a demonstration 
reactor or "hot" laboratories ("Atom und Strom", 
January I968, 146); 
(ii) The British studies, up to the end of I968 and 
excluding the initial exploratory phase, consumed 
£75 million, or about 200 million u.a.; 
(iii) The French project (Euratom Association) also 
reached nearly 200 million u.a. - excluding 
Phénix - by the end of 1969· 
15 
In the Annex we describe some of the significant 
aspects of the ORGEL research and development programme 
and the way they developed. 
6. ES80R (photographs 1 and 2) and 
ECO (photograph 3) 
6.1 We shall first of all discuss the ESSOR complex, 
the centrepiece of the ORGEL Project. 
ESSOR is a complex comprising a reactor, with a 
total power of 45 MWth, a huge storage pond for active 
components, and two high-activity laboratories. 
The decision to build was taken in October 1962; 
the civil engineering work started on site on 24 August 
1963. The reactor first went critical on 19 March I967 
and reached full power on 19 June 1969· Annex 1 (pp. 89-
90) gives a very brief description of the plant. 
6.1.1 From the beginning of the studies, in early 
October 1959, the technical heads on the project 
were aware that the fuel element studies and irradiations 
must be given priority. Euratom had signed an agreement in 
1 
1959 with AECL (p. 27, Section 7.1) which enabled some 
irradiations to be done in the Chalk River NRX reactor, 
but these operations lacked flexibility. Because of this, 
1 
Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd 
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the irradiation facilities inside the Community and outside 
(Denmark, for instance) were prospected at the same time, 
and studies for the construction of the project's own 
facilities launched. The prospects outside the Community 
proved disappointing. Inside the Community, the two reactors 
which offered space were the BR-2 at Mol, still in the course 
of construction, and the HFR at Petten, which was to come 
into service in 1962 . 
But neither of these two reactors was really 
suitable for irradiating ORGEL reactor sub-assemblies. A 
heavy-water reactor implies relatively large sub-assemblies, 
and a largely thermal neutron spectrum. Only the BR-2 could 
offer holes of sufficient diameter to hold an ORGEL channel, 
but the height under flux, less than 50 cm, was far too 
small and would give rise to non-typical stress gradients. 
Moreover, the gamma heating alone in the natural uranium 
exceeded 20 W/g, which was precisely the specific fission 
power aimed at in the fuel at that time. 
Lastly, the planning of the BR-2 power run-up 
was still uncertain, as was the issuing of the operating 
licence. 
6.1.2 Meanwhile, the initial specifications for a test 
loop reactor were prepared and printed on 20 
September i960. Beforehand we had visited all the nuclear 
designers in the Community to ask them if they would be 
1 
First normal operating cycle, 29 October I962. 
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?m 
interested in constructing a test reactor for the ORGEL 
system; nine had replied in the affirmative. On 28 October 
i960 the specifications for the test reactor were sent 
to them and they were asked to submit a tender. One firr 
cried off; eight replied, two or three of which stood 
out clearly from the others through their general expe-
rience in nuclear matters and their special knowledge 
regarding heavy water. 
But the Commission thought that for such a big 
construction job, the only one on its programme, it would 
be more suitable to call in the industry of the whole 
Community rather than a firm of only one nationality. An 
invitation was therefore issued to set up consortia. Two 
consortia were formed and three firms remained isolated. 
The Commission awarded contracts to each 
consortium to produce a preliminary draft design. For the 
construction of ECO, only the three firms who belonged to 
no consortium were consulted (p. 26, Section 7.2.2). 
The two consortia sent in the file of their work 
on 20 May 1961, the two proposed versions - both technically 
viable - -vere compared, and the choice fell on the one 
prepared by the GAAA-Interatom consortium. 
6.1.3 A year had already passed since the first studies 
on the problem. It was arguable that this delay 
was necessary to bring the affair to maturity and that, 
now that a designers' consortium had been formed, we must 
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make up for lost time by going ahead as fast as possible; 
There were still a number of advocates, however, 
of two other solutions, rivals to the test loop reactor; 
one of these consisted in mounting one or more loops in 
the BR-2, Mol, and/or in the HFR, Petten, reactor; the 
other was to build a small experimental reactor (40 MWth) 
entirely organic-cooled. 
The latter solution did not lack supporters on 
technical grounds, since many thought the overall soundness 
of the concept ought to be demonstrated as early as possible 
and that the experimental reactor would provide the shortest 
and most convincing proof. Yet we had to make sure that 
adequately proven answers to such problems as the pressure 
tube, the fuel element and the coolant cleaning system would 
be ready at the right time. The Annex makes it clear that in 
1961, when the ORGEL programme had barely got off the ground, 
the uncertainties in the key fields were so great that one 
might well hesitate at such a gamble. 
The Canadians did not share this view and were 
1 designing a prototype reactor, the OCDR , which was to have 
a capacity of 350-400 MWth and embodied the principal 
features of a power reactor. 
But their position was not the same as ours, for 
they, v/ith the elements developed for CANDU, had solutions 
they could fall back on in the way of fuel and channels which 
could be used if the organic coolant temperature was lowered. 
1 
Organic-Cooled Deuterium Reactor 
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Thus, with Euratom building a loop reactor and AECL a proto-
ni 
type, a certain division of labour emerged . 
6.1.4 The Commission did not think a decision to build 
the loop test re&ctor could be taken as early as 
July 1961 and it asked for additional information; a contract 
for more detailed studies was signed on 20 October I96I with 
the G.M.AA-Interatom group, who, as a result, submitted a 
detailed preliminary design on 16 July 19'62 ; and a full 
project for an irradiation loop in the BR-2 was prepared by 
a Belgian industrial firm, SERAI, and submitted on 30 April 
1962. The different solutions were examined in comparative 
studies; numerous discussions were held, particularly within 
the Scientific and Technical Committee. Furthermore, in the 
context of preparing the Second Five-Year Programme, a joint 
ad hoc committee, composed of members of the Consultative 
Committee on Nuclear Research and members of the Scientific 
2 and Technical Committee, considered this problem and 
decided unanimously in favour of building the specific 
test reactor rati.er than the irradiation loops. 
For the Second Five-Year Programme all the paths 
were nevertheless left open, since the construction of 
both a BR-2 loop and a loop test reactor figured in the 
proposal regarding ORGEL, but the 10 million u.a. cut that 
1 x 
xn actual fact tre AECL partly came round to Euratom*s 
point of view, deciding in September I96I to abandon the 
OCDR concept and replace it with the OTR (Organic Test 
Reactor 1), a loop reactor much closer in design to 
ESSOR than to the former OCDR. 
2 
This committee met in Brussels on 12 February and 13 
March I962 with Mr Gibrat as its Chairman. It comprised 
experts from the six countries. It submitted its report 
on 5 April "19o2. 
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was imposed in the last minute in ORGEL's five-year ap-
propriation, to bring the total programme budget down to 
an acceptable figure, left no alternative but to drop 
the in-pile circuit. 
After discussions which dragged on through the 
whole of the summer of 1962, the Commission decided, on 
10 October 1962, to build the loop test reactor. By then 
29 months had gone past since the officials in charge of 
the project had advised that the irradiation devices should 
be developed with all possible speed. 
The project was never to recover from these 
delays which occurred at the start of its life, the most 
critical period when time is doubly valuable. 
6.1.5 The Commission had decided to build ESSOR at 
Ispra. A site therefore had to be chosen and the 
necessary preliminary work done. At the same time an in-
dustrial architect's contract was awarded to the GAAA-
Interatora design-study consortium, expanded to take in the 
1 Italian company of Montecatini , with GAAA acting as leader. 
The architect formula was preferred to that of a main con-
tractor, because the Commission wanted to reserve the right 
to select the companies for the main contracts. This- was 
not a trouble-free process since, for example, the Commission 
took no less than eight months - at such a critical planning 
period and in spite of several warnings from the industrial 
architect - to decide how to split up the various "regulation 
and control system" contracts. (And of course, once the 
breakdown was decided on, all the administrative and technical 
procedure leading up to the signing of the contracts still 
had to be gone through.) 
1 
Now Montedison. 
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6.1.6 Finally, it was July 1963 when the first concrete 
was poured for the foundation-raft of the leaktight 
enclosure. From then on, the goal was to get the reactor to 
the criticality stage. To achieve this, we did our planning 
by the PERT method, which had proved itself in the United 
States, more especially in the military field, but had been 
used very little in Europe at that time. Although the indus-
trial architect followed our lead quite quickly in this 
method, we sometimes ran into great difficulties with the 
suppliers. 
It was certainly due to the general application of 
this method that the date set in I962 for going critical was 
met in I967, to within 20 days. The fact that with PERT one 
can foresee the sequences well ahead and make the necessary 
adjustments enabled us to absorb most of the administrative 
1 delays we encountered during this operation. 
An example of administrative red tape: Euratom's Second 
Five-Year Programme, worth 415 million u.a., was to cover 
the five years from 1963 to 1967· The Council's budgetary 
experts announced straightaway that, to prevent any tempta-
tion to use up the funds too quickly, each annual budget was 
to keep fairly close to one-fifth of the five-year appropri-
ation. This decision was patently a hampering one at a time 
of heavy capital investment. As it was impossible to divert 
the the funds for one sector into another sector, the 
experts' reasoning was extended step by step to cover each 
head and even each item in the budget, although it is obvi-
ous that in the case of ESSOR, the commitments curve was 
bound to go through a very sharp peak in the year following 
the decision to build, after which it would drop again. To 
get the log-jam moving, we were instructed to commit equiv-
alent sums in each year! The legal and financial departments 
had to work out a procedure of fractional commitments which 
complicated everyone's life and wasted time, without doing 
any good anywhere in the end. 
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6.1.7 After the reactor had gone critical, the facility 
still had to be brought into operation. To do this, 
it was essential to increase the staff assigned by Euratom to 
this project. In deciding to build ESSOR, the Commission had 
not thought it its duty to grant the personnel needed to set 
up an operating unit. Even so, an embryo unit was formed of 
a few individuals in 1964, but it grew very slowly as it v/as 
not given a proper staff. 
Until the reactor went critical this staff shortage 
had been concealed by the industrial firms' contributions, 
but when it came into "nuclear" service the staff clearly had 
to belong, like the responsibilities, to Euratom. The Commission 
then decided to step up the forming of the ESSOR Operating 
Division. But we were entering the era (1967) when the Member 
States resolved to put a ceiling on Euratom's personnel estab-
lishment. All the available slots were assigned to the ESSOR 
operating team but, with the time lost in getting the people 
to the site and training them, this team was not ready in due 
time; moreover, a feeling of frustration grew up in the Ispra 
laboratories, who saw their own recruiting stopped. 
6.1.8 Another difficulty arose out of the budget problems. 
Most of the ESSOR supply contracts, covering one to 
three years, contained price revision clauses. There resulted 
a rise in the real costs which, though moderate in percentage 
terms, was appreciable in absolute value because of the large 
sums involved. But the Community's research budget is in-
flexible. 
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The Commission's powers to transfer from one 
1 head to another are very limited and, even where they 
exist, they are not easy to exercise. 
The ORGEL Project was not alone in this situation 
and in 1964 the Commission embarked on a procedure to modify 
the Second Programme to meet the rise in the cost of living. 
This procedure was completed after more than a year and 
supplementary sums were allocated, on definitive terms how-
ever, for the three years the Programme still had to run. 
Naturally costs vient on rising. To cope with the contract 
commitments we had to use up a good part of the funds ear-
marked for starting up the facility, and in particular for 
paying temporary skilled personnel. 
The Member States, notified several times of the 
situation, adopted different attitudes: some suggested that 
the staff of the Ispra Establishment services should be 
used temporarily, while others opposed this. Hence, although 
ESSOR went critical at the scheduled date, its power run-up 
took a year longer than it would normally have done. 
1 
The financial regulation authorizes transfers under each 
budget head. In principle, therefore, there should be no 
subdivision of heads in the published budget. But it is 
for the Council to decide what is a head and what is not; 
so that the power of transfer vanishes in practice. 
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6.1.9 By the way of illustration of the kind of dif­
ficulties we encountered between criticality 
and the run-up to full power, mention may be made of the 
fact that in December 1968, at the meeting of the Council 
of Ministers to discuss the Euratom programme for 1969t 
the commissioning and operating of the ESSOR organic cir­
cuits were ruled out although no decision had yet been 
taken to stop the ORGEL Project, since the industrial con­
sortium's "Prototype" file (ρ·36, Section 9) had just 
been submitted and the Ispra laboratories were preparing 
1 the ORGEL channels and fuels which were to be irradiated . 
Thus ESSOR reached its full power in 1969 with 
only the boiling light-water experimental loop constructed 
for the Cirene programme. At its meeting of 30 June I969 
the Council of Ministers entered the start-up of the organic 
loops on the programme, for six months, but did not allocate 
funds for this operation, and asked that other experiments 
than the ones planned in the ORGEL context be found for 
irradiation in the organic loop. 
To sum up, the time devoted, during the develop­
ment of ESSOR, simply to overcoming the various forms of 
2 
resistance can be estimated as at least three years ..In 
such a rapidly changing field as that of nuclear technol­
ogy, such delays were bound to be fatal to the future-of 
the Project. 
ORGEL was abandoned on 30 June I969. 
2 
A year between the autumn of 1959 and the decision to 
build, in October 1962; a year between the decision to 
build (October I962) and criticality (March I967); a 
year between criticality (March I967) and full power 
operation (June I969)· 
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6o2 ECO 
6.2.1 The building of ECO was not an essential part 
of the ORGEL Project (see Annex). In 1960, 
heavy-water reactor physics was being studied experimen-
tally in France, Canada, Sweden and the United States, 
where zero power heavy-water reactors were in operation. 
Admittedly the introduction of organic coolant into the 
lattice raised new problems, but the findings most neces-
sary to the Project could have been obtained by way of 
specific test contracts (this method was in fact employed 
at the outset of the Project). 
The building of ECO was a typical example of how 
the Ispra Establishment was given an ORGEL bias and how the 
Project contributed to the Establishment's major equipment. 
To justify the construction of a new zero power 
heavy-water reactor, it had to offer new facilities unob-
tainable with existing reactors. ECO was therefore designed 
with characteristics that were both new and relatively 
complex; instead of the very simple fuel suspension system 
ordinarily found on the critical experiments, it was decid-
ed to use an automatic pitch-changing device. The design 
also included a device for heating the heavy water, with 
the requisite controls. 
One of the still unexplored areas of heavy-water 
reactor physics was the study of lattices containing reproc-
essed or irradiated fuels with a plutonium content. With 
this in view, ECO was equipped with substantial shielding 
so that it could receive irradiated fuel. 
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It was also planned to mount an accelerator 
beneath the reactor vessel, in line with its centre-line. 
ECO likewise allows "square wave oscillation" 
of a complete fuel element, new or irradiated; this demands 
space, machinery and substantial shielding. 
In short, ECO was to be a big step forward in 
facilities for studying heavy-water lattices and, from 
the standpoint of wise coordination of facilities inside 
the Community, the more out-of-date installations ought to 
have been given up when it came into service, or at the 
least the various work should have been shared out by 
joint agreement. 
7.2.2 In April I96I the Commission issued an invitation 
to tender, limited to the three firms who had 
joined a consortium for the second stage of the ESSOR bid-
ding (p. 16, Section 6.1.2) and awarded a turnkey contract 
for ECO to one of them, Neratoom. 
The contract came into force on 15 December I96I. 
The time allowed up to provisional acceptance was 22.5 months, 
which meant that the reactor would be commissioned at the 
beginning of November 1963· But Neratoom was first of all 
held up by slippages in the schedule of the firm doing the 
civil engineering work, and then ran into unforeseen dif-
ficulties. The actual construction time was 40 months. The 
Commission took over the unfinished reactor on 20 May I965, 
completed it, and took it into service on 11 December 1965· 
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The consequence of these delays was that ECO 
arrived too late on the heavy-water scene. The CEA v/ent 
1 
on u s ing Aquilon, and then built Eole at Cadarache ; 
finally, Aquilon was sold in I967 to the CNEN who, adding 
it to the RB-2 reactor, formed a unit for heavy-water 
lattice studies at Bologna. 
Admittedly ECO provided useful and numerous 
results, after the Ispra teams had put it in working 
order, but the original intention of concentrating Com-
munity research was a failure. 
7. ORGEL's development in the international 
context 
7.1 In 1958 the Euratom Commission and the AECL 
had signed an agreement for cooperation in the 
2 field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. This agreement , 
which came into force on 18 November 1959 for ten years, 
included a technical agreement by which the contracting 
parties would undertake a common research and development 
programme centred on the type of heavy-water moderated 
reactor that would be utilized in the Community and in 
Canada. Although the heavy-water cooled and moderated 
type of reactor had been explicitly mentioned in the 
agreement, a fact which would have allowed the large-
scale concentration we referred to in Section 2.2 (p. 5)5 
the agreement was focused on the organic-cooled reactor 
as soon as Euratom decided to centre its efforts on this 
variant. 
1 
The work was started in mid-1964. 
2 
Published in the "Journal Officiel" of the Communities, 
No. 60, 24 November 1969-
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The technical agreement also stipulated that each 
contracting party would contribute an equal share to the 
joint programme, up to a total of 5 million u.a. each, for 
a period of five years. There were clauses providing for 
exchanges of information and knowhow. An annual meeting was 
to be held, to review the programmes and results. The first 
took place at Chalk River from 30 May to 3 June I960, and 
the second at Ispr'a on 19-23 June I96I. 
1 7.2 At that time the American "all organic" programme 
2 
was in full swing: the OMRE reactor was functioning 
well, the town of Piqua had decided to have its lighting 
supplied by an organic reactor which was under construction; 
a 150 MWe "all organic" power plant (known as AKS) was pro-
posed by Atomics International to West German electricity 3 producers . If agreed to, research on organic coolants might 
be included in the well-known US-Euratom agreement which 
if linked the USAEC and Euratom together» Lastly, Canada and 
the USAEC had agreements concerning, on the one hand, heavy-
water reactors, and on the other, the use of organic liquids 
in reactors. 
A distinction must be made between the reactors which, in 
nuclear jargon, are known as "all organic" and the"organic/ 
heavy-water" reactors. The former are both moderated and 
cooled with an organic fluid. Hence their nuclear charac-
teristics (enrichment, core structure) are close to those 
of the pressurized light water reactors. In the second type, 
however, the moderating is done by heavy water and the 
organic fluid is used only to extract the heat. 
2 
Organic-Moderated Reactor Experiment 
KBWP: Kernkraft Baden-Württemberg Planungsgesellschaft, a 
body acting on behalf of several electricity producers. 
if 
United States Atomic Energy Commission 
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7.3 Thus there existed a triangle; its sides did 
not all meet exactly, but an effort to achieve 
a genuine triangular cooperation was accomplished and as 
a result the annual Euratom-AECL meeting was held, on 11-
15 June 1962, at Los Angeles in the presence of the USAEC 
and its contractors. Unfortunately the difficulties en-
1 cou· tered in the operation of the OMRE reactor discouraged 
the Americans, who cut back their "all organic" programme 
(10 December I962) and decided to shut down OMRE on 30 June 
1963, pending the results of the Canadian "organic/heavy-
water" jjrogramme on the one hand and the Piqua reactor oper-
ating results on the other. The offer to build the AKS 
reactor was not followed up. 
7.4 The AECL reacted by slackening its effort on its 
"organic/heavy-water" programme in favour of a 
hastily launched programme relating to the boiling light-
water cooled variant, for which it v/as proposed to build 
a prototype (Gentilly). At the end of I963 the ORGEL Pro-
ject therefore found itself far.more lonely than at its 
birth. This did not fail to evoke, inside the Community, 
numerous criticisms which, although they did not stop the 
Project, nevertheless generally increased resistance to 
its progress. 
And yet the initial results of the research 
programme were appreciable and the construction of ESSOR 
was getting on. 
1 
Both we and the Canadians had foreseen these difficulties, 
which were due to the fact that, in their haste to build, 
those responsible for the OMRE programme had completely 
overlooked the absolute need for rigorous purification of 
the coolant. Fig. 8 illustrates this point. 
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7.5 It was at this juncture that the USAEC, on 
the strength of extremely affirmative reports 
submitted by the Oak Ridge teams in the first half of 
1964, decided to take up organic cooling again, this time 
in conjunction with heavy-water moderating: this was the 
HWOCR project (24 July 1964). Combustion Engineering and 
Atomic International were chosen to be the chief contrac-
tors. A sum of 20 million u.a. was alloted to the project 
for the first year. At a single stroke the USAEC leased 
half the WR-1 reactor from the AECL, likewise the U-3 
organic loop of the NRU reactor, and took over for its 
own account the greater part of the work done by the 
Canadians. 
7.6 On 10 September 1964 the Chairman of the USAEC, 
Mr Glenn Seaborg, visited the Euratom Commission 
on his way through Brussels, congratulated it on having 
had the sense to persevere along a good line, recognized 
that ORGEL was ahead of the HWOCR and proposed an agreement 
for collaboration between the HWOCR and ORGEL projects. He 
added that the USAEC was going to put so vigorous an effort 
into the HWOCR that he hoped to see ORGEL's lead shortened. 
Everyone interested in ORGEL saw that this was a second 
chance. Even so, Mr Seaborg's proposal failed to receive 
a reply until five months after it was formulated. Then, 
when the Commission proposed a draft agreement to the 
¡.ember States (4 May 1965), they were unable to reach 
agreement on its content. 
1 
Heavy Water Organic-Cooled Reactor 
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After 22 months of argument, the problem 
solved itself with the decision to abandon the HWOCR, 
announced by the USAEC on 9 March 1967· In spite of 
excellent technical results, budgetary considerations 
2 nad prevailed . There was also a snortage of qualified 
reactor staff owing to the boom in orders for light 
water reactors. The HWOCR project was demolished as 
energetically as it had been mounted. 
Dates, rather than words, will give the clearest picture 
of this episode: 
10 September 1964: 
16 February 1965: 
4 May 1965: 
11 November I965: 
21 March I966: 
8 June 1966: 
13 December I966 
20 December I966 
23 February I967 
9 March 1967 
Mr Seaborg visits Brussels. 
Euratom Commission's provisional reply, 
First memorandum from Commission to 
Council proposing collaboration. 
Another memorandum from Commission to 
Council urging the proposal. 
Draft "Memorandum of Understanding" 
forwarded to Council. 
An additional table specifying the 
fields for cooperation forwarded to 
the Council. 
Modified tables forwarded successively. 
USAEC announces that HWOCR project is 
being abandoned. 
Visit to the USAEC, in Washington, on 5-6 June 1967· 
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8. ORGEL's progress in the Community context 
8.1 A reproach often levelled at the Commission by 
the Member States was that "they were not given 
sufficient information on the development of its programmes", 
Arduous debates on the problem of "Dissemination of Informa-
tion" continued for several years. Although a great many 
reports and papers had been prepared and delivered to the 
recipients nominated or approved by the Member States, 
information on the Commission's programmes did not seem 
to be spreading sufficiently. 
It was to improve the situation in regard to ORGEL 
that the Euratom Commission decided in I965 that a general 
and detailed view of the Project and its prospects should 
be set before the interested bodies, industrial firms and 
electricity producers, of the member countries. This 
meeting was held at Ispra on 25-28 October I965, in the 
presence of delegates appointed by the six countries and 
drawn from private industry as well as from public enter-
prises and research centres. 
They were given a comprehensive review of the 
various guidelines chosen for the research programme, and 
a description of the results obtained. Literature was 
distributed in abundance and visits were paid to labo-
ratories. 
8o2 It was at this moment that the Project's principal 
technical option was discussed in detail - the 
use, for the fuel element, of uranium carbide as fuel 
1 and SAP as cladding. 
1 
Sintered aluminium-alumina powder (see Annex). 
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This combination was far from generally known 
in I960 and the ORGEL Project had the merit of bringing 
it to light, sticking to it and, finally, convincing 
1 2 Canadians and Americans of its soundness ' . The latter 
had centred their studies on Zircaloy-clad oxide, simply 
because they were already familiar with these materials, 
separate and in combination; but this fuel element quite 
early proved to be unsuitable for organic cooling, because 
the zirconium alloy hydrided very quickly at the temper-
atures to which, as cladding, it was subjected, and further-
more the natural uranium oxide had rather too low a density 
of fissile nuclei to allow sufficient burn-up, allowing 
for the fact that the hydrogen in the organic liquid ab-
sorbs neutrons. 
Uranium carbide, on;the other hand, had a higher 
density of fissile nuclei and, above all, its excellent 
thermal conductivity meant that fuel elements could be 
designed with solid rods, favourable to the neutron balance 
SAP, which in its turn has far greater conductivity than 
zirconium, combined very well with carbide. The Americans, 
in their HWOCR programme, successsfully carried out ir-
radiations of SAP-carbide fuel reaching burn-ups of over 
16,000 MWd/t in the Canadian Whiteshell organic reactor 
(WR-1). 
Thus with the SAP-carbide fuel ORGEL, fuelled 
with natural uranium, would be a reactor with reasonable 
performance values, comparable or slightly superior to 
those of the other natural-uranium fuelled reactors. 
1 
For its HWOCR programme the USAEC purchased large quantities 
of SAP from Montecatini, who had researched and developed it 
under an ORGEL contract. 
2 
p. 59, Annex, Section 1.3.2 
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8.3 But in 1965 it was already apparent that this 
was no longer enough and that a project must 
have a distinctly higher potential than its rivals if it 
was to be developed further. The use of SAP-carbide fuel 
made this possible, but this time by dividing the fuel and 
exploiting the carbide potential far more thoroughly. 
Naturally, to carry off the generated fission heat, the 
organic coolant channel cross-section had to be consider-
ably enlarged and the fuel slightly enriched (by about 
1.25% absolute). 
This enriched ORGEL reactor, which incidentally 
needed a less exacting technology than the natural uranium 
version, offered an appreciable economic potential. Our 
arguments were, of course, debated, criticized and chal-
lenged, but the impression that remained was strongly pos-
itive. Interest in carbide soared and other organizations 
found that by substituting carbide for oxide in their 
projects they made a great leap forward. Nevertheless, 
although the carbide was wholly compatible with the organic 
liquid, it was less so with CO and not at all compatible 
with water; so ORGEL still kept its lead. 
8.4 The German reaction was not long in coming, 
however; they thought "all this would be far 
more credible if it had the support of industry". We had 
no objection from this angle, as the results of the re-
search programmes were by then substantial enough to serve 
as the basis for an industrial project. 
1 
p. 54, Annex, Section 1.2 
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Unfortunately, the Community context was 
deteriorating; the Commission found both its term and 
the Second Five-Year Programme coming to their end in 
an atmosphere thick with uncertainties. There seemed to 
be difficulty in getting talks going with the Council on 
programme problems; the Consultative Committee on Nuclear 
Research, which had been conceived for the express purpose 
of discussing the preparation of programmes with the Com-
mission, had ceased to meet. In the more specific matter 
of ORGEL the situation was no less critical; the agree-
ment with the USAEC, mentioned in Section 7 (p. 27) had 
failed to mature. In practice, Germany was showing more 
and more reluctance to pursue the ORGEL Project; Italy, 
having recently decided to build a small (30 MWe) demon-
stration reactor of the boiling-water cooled type (Cirene) 
was no longer interested in ORGEL. Belgium officially dis-
claimed any interest in heavy-water reactors. 
In such a setting the Commission, itself irres-
olute regarding ORGEL, did not care to propose to the 
Council to undertake the construction of a prototype. It 
confined itself to promoting a more limited scheme which 
it could cover with the funds available - the "ORGEL Pro-
totype Competition". 
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9. The "ORGEL Prototype Competition" 
9.1 This scheme was prompted by two desires, first, 
to transfer the file of acquired knowledge to 
the nuclear industry, and secondly, to obtain from the 
industry a tender suitable for consideration by a customer. 
In November I965, when this operation was started, it was 
not as clear as it is now that new types of reactors 'hold 
practically no interest for electricity producers, who 
demand more warranties for them than for the "proven" 
types. Also, a chemical company producing organic liquids 
had expressed interest in the combined production of steam 
and electricity from an ORGEL power plant. 
What was needed,, therefore, was a firm tender 
accompanied by a certain number of guarantees concerning 
the fuel cycle and the power generated by the power plant. 
Naturally this could only stem from a very detailed pre-
liminary design which would take all the existing work into 
account. Such an operation would be costly and no industrial 
firm would take the risk without a good prospect of building 
the reactor, and this only the Council could provide. 
An incentive was therefore found: a premium would 
1 be paid to the group(s) of firms under certain conditions 
and retained if the prototype was not built. Should -it be 
built, however, the amount of the premium would be deducted 
from the group's fees, if it was engaged as the Industrial 
Architect. Lastly, in exchange for this premium, the Com-
mission would be given larger user rights over the 
1 
These were essentially connected with the quality 
of the tender itself. 
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specifications file than are normally granted in such 
matters and, in particular, the right to consult anyone 
it wished. This system carried the inherent risk of a 
price which, unhampered by the penalties of building 
with genuine warranties, might harm ORGEL's cause: if 
it were low, nobody would believe it; if high, they 
would say "I told you so!". 
The other aim fulfilled by the ORGEL Prototype 
Competition was that it would permit of completing the 
studies in the Commission's own departments. The develop-
ment of ESSOR was mailing progress, but the failure to 
reach agreement with the USAEC regarding the HWOCR and the 
dropping of that project had been a harsh blow. 
The unpropitious Community atmosphere and the 
mounting uncertainties sapped all initiative. Interest was 
flagging in the laboratories. The prototype competition 
enabled us to gather up the threads and continue the ORGEL 
Project to its end. 
9.2 Only one consortium responded to the invitation 
1 
to tender, the same one as had built ESSOR , 
expanded to include Benelux firms for the supplies esti-
mates. 
The capacity had been set at 250 MWe, which at 
that time was high for a prototype; we did not think it 
possible to go any higher without the risk of scaring 
off a possible customer. Moreover, this capacity averted 
dissension on the "natural or enriched" question, because 
1 
GAAA-Interatom-Montedison 
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at 250 MWe the prototype had to be enriched, by reason 
of its mere size. On the other hand, the design study 
showed that, precisely through the effect of scale, a 
slightly larger capacity (300-350 MWe) would have ap-
preciably reduced the capital costs. 
The study began in July I967 with a detailed 
briefing of the consortium on all the work already done 
in connection with ORGEL. A collection of reports had 
been specially prepared by the Ispra departments or the 
Project. Then the preliminary design work proper began, 
a certain number of studies relating particularly to 
the core being sub-contracted by the consortium to the 
ORGEL Project's design office. The consortium submitted 
its preliminary design to the Commission on 31 December 
1968. 
9o3 The price quoted was, as regards the capital 
costs, a fair one for a prototype of that size, 
but of course it did not provide a kilowatt/hour cost to 
rival that of a large-scale proven-type power plant. 
The specifications file showed up three important 
points. First, the fuel consumption cost was too high for 
a heavy-water reactor. This was due to the fact that the 
SAP-clad uranium carbide fuel was expensive, not being 
backed by a big production line. There was a ,good prospect 
that the price could be lowered substantially, but only in 
the context of a production line supplying a number of 
reactors. It was becoming clear that a whole series of 
commercial power plants would have to be built; this ques-
tion is discussed in Section 10.2.2 (p. 41). 
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Offered the alternative of a reactor fuelled 
with natural or with slightly enriched uranium - with 
the latter, as we said in Section 8.3 (p. 34), one could 
use a less exacting reactor technology and obtain spec-
tacular savings on the cost per kWh - the consortium 
decided upon a middle way which provided a solution to 
two other problems common to heavy-water variants that 
use a coolant wi.th a higher absorbing power than the 
moderator, namely, the reactor's inherent instability, 
and the reactivity introduced by a drop in the coolant 
level. The only way to limit the effects of these draw-
backs is by under-moderating the lattice and slightly en-
riching the fuel. That is what the consortium did (fol-
1 lowing the Birtish example in the SGHWR ) and they chose 
an enrichment rate of 1.28%. 
The consortium also suggested that certain 
well-defined additional research work should be done, 
and stressed the urgency of using ESSOR to irradiate 
the channel assemblies. 
10. The context surrounding the Commission's 
decision to stop the project 
10.1 The intrinsic context 
We mentioned in Section 6.1.9 (p. 24) that 
the 1969 programme made no provision for 
operation of the ESSOR organic circuits. This decision 
had been taken on 20 December I968, i.e., at the time 
Steam Generating Heavy-Water Reactor, enrichment about 2%\ 
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when the Commission was receiving the consortium's file 
for the ORGEL prototype. No proposal to drop the Project 
had been formulated by the Commission at that time. The 
Second Five-Year Programme, however, had been at an end 
since 31 December 1967· 
The year I968, and then I969» were "transition" 
years during which, in actual fact, the Atomic 
Energy Community was no longer endowed with a real pro-
gramme. Hence there were scant grounds for hoping that, 
in such a context, a quick decision would be taken in-
volving large sums of money and a fundamental aspect of 
industrial policy, especially as the "outside" nuclear 
context had also changed considerably since ORGEL was 
first launched. 
10.2 The outside context 
10.2.1 In 1969, there are various proven-type reactors 
1 on which industry is expending an enormous effort . 
The fast reactors are still in the development stage, but 
their advent is predicted for the decade I98O-9O. The "inter-
mediate" reactors, which include the heavy-water and "high-
temperature" types, seem to have got caught between the 
proven-type and the fast reactors. 
In consequence, the tendency is to justify them 
as an insurance against possible, though not certain, 
troubles - major uranium price rises, enriched uranium 
1 
For example, the light-water reactor capacity in operation, 
under construction or on order throughout the world totalled, 
in round figures, 82,000 MWe on 1 October 1969; of these, 
48,000 MWe are of the PWR and 34,000 MWe of the BWR type. 
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supply difficulties, late arrival of the fast reactors. 
To be justifiable, the cost of developing these inter-
mediate systems ought to be moderate. Unfortunately, they 
are subdivided into too many variants. 
For the heavy-water systems, there are six 
1 variants , some of them with more than one version; for 
the high-temperature system, two, one of them in two 
versions. 
Not one of these variants enjoys a big existing 
or prospective market, apart from CANDU which reposes on 
a total capacity of 6,000 MWe in operation, under con-
struction or decided upon. 
The variants of intermediate reactors cooled 
with heavy or light water can hope to profit by the "spin-
off" from the industry's vast development of light-water 
reactors; not so the other variants cooled with a medium-
or high-temperature gas or with organic liquid. 
10.2.2 In 1969, a decision to build an intermediate 
reactor prototype means a clear committal to 
launching into an industrial series that will enable 
development costs to be offset and the techniques em-
ployed to be based on sufficiently broad 
1 
Cooled with carbon dioxide (CEA-Siemens), organic 
liquid (ORGEL), boiling light water (Canada, Italy, 
UK), heavy water in a reactor vessel, either boiling 
(Sweden) or pressurized (Siemens), heavy water in 
pressure tubes (Canada). 
42 
1 foundations . To do this, one must feel certain at 
the outset that on all levels, technical and econom-
ic, the prototype will not be merely semi-successful. 
One must also know with certainty that the power plant 
will contribute more than a minimal kWh saving over 
2 the reactors already on the market and, moreover, that 
this saving will not be offset by any lack of relia-
bility. It is clear that one cannot have this certainty 
regarding ORGEL any more than any other advanced type 
of reactor. 
Faced with unfavourable intrinsic and external 
contexts, the Commission decided to bow to the facts and 
not propose the building of a prototype to the Member 
States, i.e., to terminate the Project. It is to be re-
gretted, nonetheless, that the subject was not more widely 
debated so as to gain recognition for what had been achieved 
and to bring the whole problem of systems and prototypes 
out into the light. 
The fact is that whilst the dropping of the ORGEL 
variant is a step in the imperative direction of cutting 
down the number of intermediate reactor variants, it did 
not stem from an overall decision and it still leaves far 
too many varieties for any one of them to have a serious 
chance of making a breakthrough in time. 
This is written in the light of the present situation. 
A really concerted effort by the Community countries 
would, if made in time, have enabled them to avoid 
duplications or pseudo-rivalries and bring a larger 
number of variants up to the prototype stage, for the 
same price and in the same time. A selection could 
have been made on a practical basis. 
2 
Which are in any case moving targets. 
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CONCLUSION 
For those engaged on it the ORGEL Project was 
an enthralling experience» Whilst it achieved the targets 
set for it by the two Euratom Five-Year Programmes, it 
did.not attain its essential purpose, namely, to be a 
Community reactor system. Circumstances prevented this. 
Nevertheless, the Project gave rise to developments of 
sufficient importance to have left notable traces and 
enriched the experience of those who worked on them. 
The ORGEL experiment could still be turned to 
good account if the lessons it provided on the pitfalls 
to be avoided in Community-wide technical cooperation 
were borne in mind. Without claiming to be exhaustive or 
original in so complex a field, we can say that the pro-
cedure laid down in Article 7 of the Euratom Treaty, which 
has governed the Euratom programmes, including ORGEL, up 
to now, is not ideally suitable for the carrying out of 
a large-scale technical project, where time and efficiency 
are all-important, and that it is highly likely to bring 
such a project to a halt. 
Yet this procedure could conceivably be employed 
effectively, and other more suitable machinery can probably 
be found in the Treaty, but to be any good it must enable 
the industry to play its proper part. It may appear attrac-
tive at first sight to share the expenses involved in the 
construction of large prototypes by building them on a 
Community basis, but we must not forget that prototype-
building is not an end in itself and that the resultant 
reactors have to be sold under market conditions. 
-44-
Thus we come back to the competence of the 
industry, for which provision must be made from the 
very start by furnishing acceptable answers, not only 
to the problems of industrial property rights and the 
dissemination of information (which have now been dealt 
with), but above all to the questions of structure and 
financing. 
And lastly, if ansv/ers were found to these 
knotty problems, one could still never sufficiently 
emphasize the necessity, if a Community enterprise is 
to succeed, of a profound common motivation to forge 
ahead - not forgetting that the strength of a motive 
depends largely upon awareness of the need. 
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HISTORY OF THE ORGEL PROJECT 
First mention of ORGEL in official 
Community proceedings: 1958 
Scientific and Technical Committee 
consulted: 28 Apr. 1959 
First ORGEL studies: 1 Oct. 1959 
Canada-Euratom Agreement came into 
force: 18 Nov. 1959 
Canada-Euratom Agreement: Joint Com-
mittee meeting held at Chalk River, 30 May to 
Canada: 3 Jun. I960 
Ispra Establishment handed over to 
Euratom: 19 Jul. i960 
Specifications for a test reactor, 
for testing ORGEL fuels and structures: 20 Sep. i960 
Nine Community nuclear firms consulted 
regarding construction of the test 
reactor: 28 Oct. i960 
Two multinational consortia formed: 20 Jan. I96I 
Launching of consultation for ECO: 13 Apr. I96I 
Test reactor project submitted by 
each consortium: 20 May I96I 
Canada-Euratom Agreement: second Joint 19-23 
Committee meeting held at Ispra, Italy: Jun. I96I 
Choice of one of the two ESSOR test 
reactor projects: 27 Jul. I96I 
Design contract signed with GAAA-
Interatom consortium: 20 Oct. I96I 
ECO construction contract came 
into force: 15 Dec. I96I 
Change of Euratom President: 11 Jan. I962 
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Meetings of CCNR-STC Joint Ad Hoc 
Committee to examine the ORGEL 12 Feb. I962 
proposal for the Second.Five-Year Plan: 13 Mar. I962 
CCNR-STC Ad Hoc Committee's report 
submitted: 5 Apr. I962 
Design study submitted, for two in-pile 
irradiation loops in BR-2 and HFR: 1 May I962 
Canada-Euratom Agreement: third Joint 
Committee held at Santa Monica, California, 11-15 
with USAEC present: Jun. I962 
ESSOR specifications file submitted 
by GAA-Interatom 15 Jul. I962 
Council's decision regarding the Second 
Five-Year Plan: 23 Jul. I962 
Decision to build ESSOR: 10 Oct. I962 
Start of Second Five-Year Programme 1 Jan. I963 
Start of on-site work at Ispra 12 Apr. I963 
ESSOR civil engineering work started: 24 Aug. 1963 
Scheduled date for completion of ECO: beg. Nov. 1963 
Budget head "ORGEL Research" split into 
two items: Contract Research and Own 
Research projects: Jan. 1964 
Second Five-Year Programme revised: 1964 
Mr Seaborg's visit to Brussels, pro-
posing ORGEL-HWOCR collaboration 10 Sep. 1964 
Commission's provisional reply: 16 Feb. I965 
Memoranda on this subject sent to 4 May 1965 to 
Council: 23 Feb. I967 
ECO taken over by Commission: 20 May I965 
ORGEL Colloquium: 26-28 Oct. I965 
ECO started up: 11 Dec. 1965 
Years in which, owing to protracted budget f1965 
discussions, the year had to be started with< I966 
provisional twelfths: I 1967 
First discussion of the "ORGEL Prototype 
Competition" operation: 17 Nov. I965 
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HWOCR abandoned: 9 Mar. I967 
ESSOR went critical: 19 Mar. I967 
Merger of Executives of the 
European Communities: 1 Jul. I967 
Start of "ORGEL Prototype Competition": 3 Jul. I967 
End of Second Five-Year Programme: 31 Dec. I967 
"Prototype Competition" specifications 
file submitted by the industrial, consortium: 31 Dec. I968 
Years of transitional budget: I968 
1969 
1970 
ESSOR first operated at full power: 19 Jun. I969 
ORGEL Project stopped: June I969 
SOME DATES RELATING TO THE AMERICAN ORGANIC PROGRAMME 
Start of organic fluid studies in United States: 1950 
Meeting at Downey, California, as a result of which poly-
phenyls were selected as the most suitable coolants: 1953 
"TID-7OO7", a collection of data on organic coolants: Jan. 1957 
OMRE went critical: 17 Sep. 1957 
Start of construction of Piqua reactor: July 1959 
Decision to scale down the OMRE research programme: 10 Dec. I962 
Piqua reactor went critical 14 Jun. 1963 
OMRE project stopped: 30 Jun. I963 
Piqua reactor shut down: 1 Feb. I966 
HWOCR project launched: 24 Jul. 1964 
HWOCR project stopped 9 Mar. I967 
SOME DATES RELATING TO THE CANADIAN PROGRAMME 
Start of OCDR studies: end 1956 
beg. 1957 
Canada-Euratom Agreement: 18 Nov. 1959 
OCDR programme stopped: 22 Sep. I96I 
Decision to build OTR (WR-1): 3 Nov. I96I 
OTR brought into service: 2 Nov. I965 
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S. Orlowski 
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1.0 Guidelines of the Project 
The ORGEL Project consisted in developing a 
reactor cooled with an organic liquid and moderated by 
heavy water. 
1.0.1 In Europe, in 1959, moderation by heavy water 
ruled out any idea of enriching the fuel; the 
reactor would have to operate on natural uranium. With 
such a fuel, together with a relatively absorbent organic 
coolant, there would be little margin in the neutron 
balance; we therefore had to use a fuel with high uranium 
density and cut down parasitic absorption in the structural 
materials (cladding, channel) and the coolant to a minimum, 
so as to keep a sufficient margin of reactivity to consume 
the fuel; the latter had to be capable of reaching a burn-
up that would make the fuel cycle economically attractive 
without any neutron physics or technological obstacle (exces-
sive swelling) and that would in any case be higher than 
the burn-up obtained in graphite reactors. 
1.0.2 The desire for improved thermodynamic efficiency 
led to the choice of a mean in-reactor coolant 
temperature higher by several tens of degrees than that 
found in the light-water reactors of those days, namely, 
of the order of 320°C. The coolant channel cross-section 
being limited, the coolant outlet temperature had to be 
in the vicinity of 400°C and the maximum cladding tem-
perature 450-500°C. 
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1.0.3 To keep down the capital costs we had to 
use inexpensive materials, already avail­
able on the nuclear market or likely to become so at 
an early date; the core rating per litre also had to 
be as high as possible, so as to lessen the impact of 
the cost of the immobilized heavy 'water on the in­
stalled Kw production cost. 
1.1 Degree of readiness of the materials and 
components available in early 1959 
A review of the materials capable, in 1959, 
of fulfilling these performance requirements revealed 
the following. 
1.1.1 Fuel 
Low-alloy uranium metal and uranium monocarbids; 
uranium oxide had to be discarded owing to its 
low uranium density and its poor thermal conductivity. 
1.1.2 Organic coolant 
A polyphenyl with low vapour pressure at 400 C; 
the mixture chosen, composed of 25% ortho-
phenyl, 71& metaterphenyl M, 3-4/4 paraterphenyl and less 
than 1/ύ diphenyl, had the disadvantage of being solid 
1 at ambient temperature and therefore needing preheated 
This mixture melts at about 80 C. 
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pipes; but experience with OMRE (Report, p. 28, Section 
7.2) showed that this was not a serious problem; more-
over, the product was available on the market and was 
under study at several laboratories. 
1.1.3 Cladding and channel 
SAP, a dispersion of fine alumina particles 
in an aluminium matrix, which would, at the 
required temperatures, give the cladding sufficient 
mechanical strength and allow the channel to contain 
the relatively low cool 
any corrosion problems. 
2 
the relatively low coolant pressure (20 kg/cm ) without 
As can be seen in Table 1, these materials or 
components were relatively new or were to be subjected 
to more strenuous working conditions than any they had 
been tested for up to that time. Thus ORGEL was going 
to need advanced R&D activities. 
1.2 Interdependence of reactor components 
1.2.1 In a nuclear reactor, neutrons occupy every 
component area of the core, whether that 
area be occupied by fuel, coolant, or structural ma-
terial. From the reactivity standpoint, the components 
contribute, positively or negatively, to the neutron 
balance - a contribution measured by their fission, 
slowing-down and absorption cross-sections. From the 
The trade name of the mixture mentioned here 
is OM-2 (Progil). 
T,; b l e 1 
A. Fuel 
a) Uranium metal 
b) Uranium carbide 
B. Structural materials 
a) SAP cladding 
b) SAP pressure tube 
C. Coolant 
Terphenyl 
State of the art 
(1959) 
Product known in the "adjusted uranium" 
form used in gas graphite reactors under 
following conditions: 
specific power: 4-6 MW/t 
burn-up: 3000 MWd/t 
New product: some laboratory research 
and irradiations under following con-
ditions : 
conductivity integral: 200 W/cm 
burn-up.^5000 MWd/t 
Product at start of development 
New product 
Product being tested in OMRE (t^370°C) 
- erformances required 
At least three times greater 
spec, power 
At least double the burn-up 
4-6 times higher conductivity 
integral 
1.5-3 times higher burn-up 
t^.500°C 
t-£-400°C + 20°C 2 
permissible stressr:3.5 kg/mm 
lifetime 20 years 
(t^400°C + 20°C) 
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energy standpoint, heat is everywhere released "in 
situ", essentially through fission, but also by 
bremsstrahlung and nuclear reactions. 
1.2.2 The interdependence of the main components 
is largely due to this shared exposure to 
radiation and is a specific feature of reactor devel-
opment projects. The interdependence is particularly 
close when the neutron balance is limited by the use 
of natural uranium, because it is then very difficult 
to modify the final design of one component without 
revising all the others; but such changes are more 
likely to prove necessary if the component is new or 
if the performances required of it are outside the 
proven range. 
Hence, for a relatively advanced project like 
ORGEL, it was undoubtedly a handicap that only small 
"margins of adjustment" could be allowed in the design 
of the different reactor components, more especially 
as there were a great many of them - moderator, coolant, 
channel, clads and fuel. 
1.2.3 Let us, for instance, consider the simplified 
cell consisting of the channel tube, the fuel 
element inside it, and the coolant flowing through it. 
A good neutron economy called for a cluster type of fuel 
element with 19 pins of adjusted metal uranium and the 
smallest amount of organic liquid (absorbent) needed 
for cooling purposes (Fig. 3a); i.e., the pins had to 
be almost touching one another. Under these conditions, 
a 2% rate of fuel swelling under irradiati:n would reduce 
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the coolant flow cross-section by 20%, causing an un-
acceptable rise in the coolant and cladding temperatures. 
It was not possible, without adversely affecting the 
1 neutron balance, to set the pins further apart or alloy 
the uranium enough to lessen the swelling, at the burn-
ups envisaged. Nor could lower burn-ups be accepted, as 
the fuel cycle cost would then be too high. 
1.2.4 In the case of a uranium carbide element, the 
fabrication costs are in inverse proportion to 
2 the pin diameter . A cluster of seven (or perhaps four) 
large-diameter pins was therefore considered (Fig. 3b); 
but this geometry fits badly into a circle and, in order 
tc reduce the amount of absorbent organic liquid, it was 
decided to put a low-absorption filler in the cell, in 
the form of an impermeable graphite jacket. To enable the 
fuel element to be handled we had to leave a clearance, 
in which the coolant flowed slowly, between the jacket 
and the channel tube. The Piqua experiment showed that 
a ring of organic liquid circulating slowly was very 
liable to become polymerized under radiation, thus jam-
ming the element and making it impossible to remove from 
the channel. The development of this fuel element was 
thereupon abandoned. 
When the decision was taken, in 1965 (Report, 
p. 34, Section 8.3), to study a reactor variant with 
slightly enriched uranium, the interdependence became 
less stringent and it was possible to revise the designs 
of certain components completely. 
1 
An addition of 1/c molybdenum, for example, led to a 
reactivity loss of nearly 1000 milliniles. 
2 
See Section 2.1.1 (p. 63) and Fig. 4. 
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1·3 The alternatives 
1.3.1 Fuel 
Low-alloy metal uranium and uranium monocarbide 
appeared to be suitable at the outset of the Project. 
I.3.I0I The former was used in the gas-graphite reactors 
at specific powers of 4-6 MW/t and burn-ups of 
3000-4000 MWd/t, with a magnesium alloy cladding., The ORGEL 
conditions called for four times the specific power, twice 
1 the burn-up and an aluminium-base cladding . By choosing 
this type of fuel vie could start with solid knowledge ac-
quired in the Community, but it would have to be used beyond 
the known limits and under different conditions. 
1.3.1.2 The second, uranium monocarbide, was at the 
stage of laboratory studies in Europe, the 
United States, and under a joint Euratom-USA programme. 
Some promising irradiations at temperatures of 7OO-0OO C 
and low specific power had been done in the United States 
2 
as part of Atomics International's SGR programme; the 
problems of production and price had not been tackled 
anywhere. 
1 
Magnesium was not compatible with the organic 
coolant. 
2 
Sodium Graphite Reactor. 
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1.3·1·3 In consequence it was decided, at the beginning 
of I960, to regard metal uranium as the reference 
fuel and uranium carbide as the alternative. 
Experience proved that this caution was justified. 
Because uranium combines with aluminium to form brittle 
intermetallic compounds, a diffusion barrier is needed. 
Nickel, chromium, niobium, silicon, and vanadium were tried; 
1 some success was obtained with the last-named , but it was 
neutron-absorbing and the deposition technology was tricky. 
At the same time, it was becoming apparent that the econom-
ically desirable burn-ups and specific powers were liable 
not to be attained without excessive swelling of the "adjusted" 
2 
type of uranium and that a major programme would be neces-
sary to develop new alloys with more stable dimensions under 
irradiation. There were only moderate chances of success, 
because the nature and quantity of the potential additives 
were limited by reactivity considerations. 
1.3.1.4 For these reasons metal uranium was abandoned 
in 1962 and uranium carbide remained the Project's 
only fuel until the end (I969 - Report, p. 32, Section 8.2). 
How the uncertainties regarding this fuel were reduced is 
described in Section 2.1, p. 62. 
1 
The formation of intermetallic compounds was limited 
to 10 microns/year at 450 C. 
2 
At the temperatures envisaged, the high specific power 
required led to swelling through cavitation, described 
shortly afterwards in the literature (Geneva Conference 
1964: paper A/CONF 28 p. 145, R.S. Barnes et al.). 
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1ο3·2 Structural materials (cladding and channels) 
The combined requirements of low neutron ab­
sorption, adequate mechanical strength at 
400 C (channel) and 500 C (clads), good corrosion strength 
in organic liquid at 400 C and a reasonable price, left 
little choice of materials, given the state of the art at 
that time (1959). 
1.3.2.1 The only widely-known zirconium alloy was Zircaloy-2, 
satisfactory from every angle except for its behaviour 
in organic liquid at high temperature, where it underwent 
hydrogen embrittlement. 
1 1.3.2.2 SAP , which had been under study for some years, 
appeared to combine good aluminium/organic com­
patibility with sufficient strength at high temperature, 
owing to the hardening effect produced by the dispersion 
of alumina particles in the aluminium matrix. 
SAP alone, therefore, was adopted as the 
structural material in the preliminary projects of the 
2 time (1959 - ORGEL, OCDR ). The absence of an alternative 
solution was dangerous to the Project, especially since 
the material was new and its properties were not well 
known. 
1 
Sintered Aluminium Powder. 
Organic Cooled Deuterium (-moderated) Reactor: 
name of the Canadian project. 
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1 1.3.2.3 That was one of the reasons why the Canadian 
General Electric team recommended experimental 
studies on the behaviour of Zircaloy in organic liquid 
at lower temperatures (320 C), at which a high degree 
of protection against hydrogen absorption appeared fea-
sible through surface oxidation of the zirconium. 
Around 1962-63 the Canadian research showed 
that hydrogen absorption could be reduced by using im-
proved alloys, provided that the organic coolant con-
tained enough water (200 ppm) and was free of chlorine 
(less than 1 ppm). 
After 1963, zirconium alloys were to become 
an alternative for SAP; they replaced it definitively 
as the channel material in 1967-68, when the creep 
strength of large-diameter finished products in SAP 
proved to be too low (p. 28, Section 2.3). 
On the other hand, SAP successfully retained 
the role of fuel cladding material, the zirconium/uranium 
carbide association having proved less favourable than 
carbide/SAP under irradiation. 
1 
Another reason ivas the Canadian reluctance to 
leave the paths already mapped in the heavy-water/ 
heavy-water reactor development field, where the 
structural material was Zircaloy (p. 17, Section 
6.1.3). 
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1 .3*3 Coolant 
A great deal of research was devoted during 
the first years of the Froject to seeking 
substitutes for the polyphenyls which would be more 
stable under radiation and heat and, if possible, 
1 cheaper . No really encouraging results were obtained 
and the research was abandoned. It was decided to keep 
to the terphenyl mixture already mentioned (p. 53, 
Section 1.1.2). 
Towards 1966, however, the AECL chose to use, 
2 for its WR-1 reactor , a hydrogenated terphenyl, HB-40, 
which unlike OM-2 was liquid at ambient temperature. The 
reasons given were that the product needed no preheating 
and was available at competitive prices on the American 
market o But, in the first place, the technical attractive-
ness of the fluid as against another is only clear if one 
compares their properties as a whole; and secondly, HB-40 
is more volatile than OM-2, which means that its use de-
mands greater precautions (p. 81, Section 2.6.4.2). It 
should be remarked, however, that the consortium which 
did the 25O MWe ORGEL prototype Project (Report, p. 36, 
Section 9) likewise chose HB-40. 
1 
Possible substitutes included the methylnaphthalenes, 
eliminated for over-high vapour pressure, the phenan-
threnes, the ternary eutectic diphenyl/terphenyl 0/ 
terphenyl M, liquid .at ambient temperature, but cost-
ing three tic-es as much as OM-2. 
2 Whiteshell Reactor 1 (p. 17, Section 6.1.3 - p. 30, 
Section 7.5)· 
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2. Progress of studies; reduction of uncertainties 
2.1 Uranium carbide 
The uncertainties essentially concerned: 
a) the definition' of an economical fabrication 
process ; 
b) behaviour under irradiation (swelling, fission 
gases) and, in particular, the carbide's tend-
ency to crack. 
The 1959 data, mainly obtained from American work 
(e.g., NAA-SR-3625, BMI-1441) showed that: 
a) fabrication was at the laboratory stage; several 
processes were under study (CH, + U, U + C, 
UO + C, etc.) with a special effort on the arc 
melting, and casting processes; no economic assess-
ment had been done, ev n for a pilot production 
system ; 
b) a certain number of small samples had been 
irradiated in capsules, at maximum tempera-
tures of about SOO C, burn-ups of less than 
10,000 MWd/t, und heat ratings of not more than 
200 W/cm; limited swelling of the carbide had 
been observed and the rate of fission gas re-
lease, which was quite low, had been measured. 
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The limit performance values still had to be 
discovered, likewise the reasons for the cracking of 
the samples observed during post-irradiation examina-
tions. 
2.1.1 The reduction of these uncertainties within 
the ORGEL Project was successfully achieved 
as regards a) by means of a seven-year study (under 
contracts) , centred on the UO + C melting and casting 
process (I96I-67). Nine tonnes of carbide were fabri-
cated, including 4.4 tonnes in 1964 by a single supplier, 
2 The first price estimates ar: 
firmed and amplified in 1967· 
rived in I965 and were con-
Three parameters have a great influence: 
2.1.1.1 The fuel pin diameter (Fig. 4b) 
The smaller diameter, the more work (casting, 
machining, checks, packaging) is required per 
kg of the product. Similarly, the recycling of waste and 
the material losses increase; hence the cost per kg of 
pin rises rapidly as the diameter decreases. 
1 
Conducted mainly by Nukem. 
Pins with 25 mm diameter; production, 100 t/year; 
cost, $30/kg. 
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2o1.1o2 Specifications (content in carbon, oxygen and 
various impurities, dimensional tolerances, 
density, defects and, particularly, surface 
state defects (Fig. 4a) 
The rejects, and therefore the fuel cost, increase 
with the stringency of the specifications. On the 
other hand, the rejection of a few pins costs less than the 
failure of a physics or irradiation experiment. For those 
reasons, strict specifications were maintained throughout 
the ORGEL Project for experimental uses; milder requirements 
were studied from 1966 onwards and then finalized in the 
context of the competition for a prototype reactor (Report, 
p. 36, Section 9)? expanded specifications - which would 
have to be proven by irradiations in a prototype reactor -
were considered prospectively for a reactor family. 
2.I0I.5 Annual production (Fig. 4a) 
The higher the annual production, the lower the 
unit costs. 
2.1.1.4 It can be concluded that, on the basis of the 
semi-industrial scale researches carried out 
in this field, the feasibility of manufacturing uranium 
carbide pins at attractive prices was confirmed. 
2.1.2 As regards point b), the most important results 
came from the United States and Canada; they 
were highly satisfactory; the ORGEL irradiation programme 
later brought in complementary results which showed the 
excellent behaviour of carbide with conductivity integrals 
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1 
of the order of 120 W/cm and over (see Fig. 5); 
as to the cracking phenomenon, it disappeared by 
itself, probably because of the care taken not to 
introduce internal stresses during fabrication. 
2.2 SAP as cladding material 
A process for fabricating a sintered 
aluminium-alumina mixture (SAP) had 
been discovered some fifteen years earlier by the 
2 Swiss firm Aluminium Industrie AG , when several 
countries considered using this material for 
cladding organic reactor fuel elements - Canada 
(OCDR programme), the USA (OMR programme), Denmark 
(DOR programme), France, etc. 
In 1959, the inherent uncertainties 
regarding the use of this material for cladding 
were connected with: 
a) the diffusion of fission products 
through the SAP; 
b) the appearance of pimples and cracks 
after prolonged heating, leading to 
leaky cans ; 
c) the welding of the can plugs; 
d) the low ductility in the hot state. 
In the context of the search for high specific 
power linked with slight fuel enrichment. 
ρ 
AIAG, which has since become Alusuxsse. 
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Uncertainties a), b) and c) were solved, one 
of them (b) very quickly by degassing at high tem-
perature the billets from which the tubes were to 
be drawn, and the others in the course of the fol-
lowing years. 
Here we shall only discuss point d). The 
mechanical strength and hot ductility of a SAP type 
of material depend upon a number of factors such as 
the size of the alumina particles, the homogeneity of 
dispersion, the percentage of alumina in the aluminium 
matrix, the quantity and nature of the impurities, the 
nature of the contacts at the aluminium/alumina inter-
faces, etc. 
Certain of these factors depend in their turn 
on the fabrication process, and in particular on the 
preparation of the powders. Consequently every effort 
was made, throughout the whole ORGEL Project, both by 
direct action at the JRC Ispra and through contacts with 
the industry, to develop new processes and new products, 
meanwhile continuing to develop the AIAG type of SAP, the 
reference material. 
Figc 6, which groups together data relating to 
1 13 different products and some thirty combinations of the 
different factors, shows that so far it has proved im-
possible to prevent any progress in ductility contributed 
by a new product from being accompanied by a chop in 
mechanical strength under rapid tensile stress; the exper-
imental points are distributed along a relatively narrow 
belt in the "elongation-rupture load" plane. 
1 
Some include another dispersion besides alumina; others 
include metal (magnesium) additives with the object of 
elucidating the influence of the nature of the dispersion 
and of the aluminium/alumina contacts. 
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In regard to the ratio of elongation to creep 
rupture around 450 C, it appears, in spite of the 
relative scattering, scantiness and heterogeneity of 
the measured results, that the foregoing phenomenon 
repeats itself, although considerably attenuated v/hen 
the experiment has gone on for a few hundred hours. 
Only "Microxal", a product obtained by evap-
orating aluminium in a controlled atmosphere, appears 
to deviate significantly from the above-mentioned belts; 
for a definite opinion, however, long-term creep results 
would be necessary. This confirms the desirability, 
already evidenced in other studies, of trying to obtain 
finer dispersions of alumina particles than in the AIAG 
type of SAP; for the diameters achieved here are smaller 
by an order of magnitude (0.003 - 0.02 microns). 
Action was not pursued in that direction, 
however, owing to: 
a) the need to devise and perfect completely 
new fabricating methods; 
b) the satisfactory in-pile behaviour of the 
carbide/SAP pins up to burn-ups of over 
15,000 MWd/t; 
c) the termination of the Project. 
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2.3 The SAP pressure tube 
The intrinsic uncertainties concerning the 
SAP pressure tube essentially concerned: 
a) the development of a fabrication process 
that would provide large-diameter (about 
100 mm) tubes with satisfactory tolerances 
and quality, against a reasonable wastage 
rate ; 
b) the permissible stress value to use in the 
calculations, this value being proportional 
to the thickness to be given to the tube. 
In 1959 the knowhow came essentially from the 
experience of the Swiss firm AIAG, work by the American 
1 firm Alcoa , and laboratory studies. The situation was 
as follows: 
a) the extrusion of large-diameter tubes had never 
yet been tried systematically; the fabrication 
of small-diameter tubes (to order) had not got 
past the small pilot-scale stage; 
b) there were more or less scanty data concerning 
the fast physical and mechanical properties. 
Creep test results were even scarcer and were 
obtained from flat test-pieces. 
1 By i960, however, Alcoa, a licensee of AIAG, decided 
to give up fabricating the basic powders necessary 
for the manufacture of SAP, and to obtain 
supplies from AIAG. 
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2.3.1 The first inherent uncertainty was cleared up 
under the ORGEL programme, and required roughly 
six years (196*1-66). More than 350 tubes, 90 mm in dia-
meter and 6 m in length, were fabricated by a single 
firm (Montedison ) working under a Euratom contract; 
the wastage rate, which was some 50% at the outset, 
dropped by a factor of over 2, even though the speci-
fications always remained very severe. It should be noted 
that a number of European tube makers, consulted in 1964 
for test productions of ten tubes, obtained results in-
ferior to those secured at the time by the firm under 
contract, a fact which appears to underline the importance 
of specialized, concentrated, long-term action for such 
developments. 
2.3o2 As to uncertainty b), Fig. 7 shows how the 
assessment of the permissible stress evolved 
with time, in the context of various organic/heavy-water 
reactor development projects. It is interesting (and 
greatly to the credit of the American engineer responsible) 
to see that the evaluation (Fig. 7, Ref. 1) done in 1957 
on the strength of a careful examination of the few, 
rather academic studies known at that time, is identical 
with the evaluation adopted after eight years of the ORGEL 
development programme. 
These two evaluations rest on the fullest 
possible analysis of the behaviour of a SAP tube under 
various stresses. On the other hand, the figure shows the 
danger of summary appraisals (Fig. 7, Refs. 4 and 9) 
based on results relating to only one type of stress. 
1 In addition, when the HWOCR project was started up in 
1965, the USAEC purchased from Montedison large quan-
tities of SAP billets and cladding tubes (p. 28, 
Section 7o2). 
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The latest collection of results (Fig. 7, 
Refs. 8, 10 and 11) show that the permissible stress 
1 value is lower than its value of interest for an 
organic heavy-water reactor fuelled with natural 
uranium. 
2.4 Organic coolant 
Knowledge in this field in 1959 relied on 
the studies that had been conducted in the 
2 
United States and Britain for some years. The aromatic 
carbides were recognized as being among the most 
radiation-stable of the organic compounds and evidence 
had been given of their promise as coolants for nucle-
ar reactors. OMRE , the first reactor cooled and mod-
erated by an organic liquid, had already been operating 
at full power (16 MWth) for a year. 
Two major uncertainties remained, however: 
a) Could an organic/cooled reactor operate over 
long periods without prohibitive fouling of 
the heat-exchange surfaces? 
b) Was the decomposition of the organic coolant 
under the action of heat and radiation suf-
ficiently limited not to give rise to coolant 
replacement costs greater than the economy of 
the organic/heavy-water concept could stand? 
1 The corresponding pressure-tube thickness is 
about 3 mm. 
2 
p. 28, Section 7o2 
Organic-Moderated Reactor Experiment. 
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2.4.1 Everyone thought uncertainty a) would be 
cleared up when OMRE had operated satis-
factorily for another year; but OMRE developed serious 
fouling and brought this problem to the fore on the 
various American, Canadian and Euratom (ORGEL) "organic" 
programmes. It quickly became clear, especially in the 
light of the Canadian studies, that the coolant would 
have to be far more highly purified than the liquid 
used in OMRE. Fig. 8 shows the development of these 
ideas, using a somewhat rough "purity index" reprer 
senting the relation between the concentrations of 
impurities (oxygen, ash, chlorine, very high polymers, 
water, etc.) permitted in the light of the operating 
results from various plants between 1958 and 1968, and 
the concentrations adopted at the end of that period 
for' the WR-1 reactor, which has been working success-
fully for four years. Thus eight years of experiments, 
the most fruitful of which were conducted in-pile, led 
to the purity requirement being multiplied by ten 
thousand. So uncertainty a) can henceforth be regarded 
as solved . 
It is curious to note the parallel with the 
trend of ideas concerning the light water for the PWR 
and BWR reactors, where the purity requirement as 
regards oxygen and insoluble substances likewise grew 
by a factor of 10,000 between the time of the pilot 
channel tests at Oak Ridge, Hanford and Chalk River 
(1952) and· the 'sixties. 
At the start of a project it seems that the 
coolant purity requirement is often underestimated; a 
good many miscalculations could be avoided by rapidly 
determining the harmful substances and eliminating them 
ruthlessly, only later relaxing the specifications if it 
can be done safely. 
«1 
In the main the theoretical studies yielded little success, 
The very positive Canadian results obtained in-pile recent-
ly suggest that the same also applies to a boiling organic 
coolant I 
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2.4.2 The second uncertainty, b), concerns the de-
composition of the coolant under the effect of 
heat (pyrolysis) and radiation (radiolysis). The former 
is slight up to about 400 C, but the Euratom experiments 
confirmed that pyrolysis is more extensive in a substance 
that has been irradiated than in one that has not, a phe-
1 nomenon which has been named radiopyrolysis . 
The results obtained on this point between 1958 
and 1967, particularly in-reactor, are quite consistent 
enough to satisfy project engineers. 
2.4.3 As regards pyrolysis, the initial OMRE operating 
results in 1969 showed that, with a mixture of 
terphenyls at 320 C containing 30/» of high polymers, 0.15 
molecules of coolant were destroyed per 100 eV energy de-
posited (G = 0.15) by radiations of any type. Assuming this 
value to be applicable to other reactors, one can calculate 
the amount of coolant decomposed in each case (calculation 
1). This hypothesis assumes that neutrons, beta and gamma 
rays have the same efficiency, although their share in the 
total radiation varies from one reactor to another. The 
electron (van de Graaff) tests dene at the same period 
yielded a value of O.OC for G, thus demolishing the above 
hypothesis and enabling the ratio of neutron efficiency 
2 ;amma efficiency t 
was 4 (calculation 2). 
to ga o be calculated. The value obtained 
The in-reactor tests conducted under the ORGEL 
programme from I962 to I968 were designed to provide a 
1 
This phenomenon, predicted by us, had not been demonstrated 
before. 
2 
Assuming the latter to be the same as that of the electrons, 
and the additive effects. 
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firmer basis for the value of G and of the neutron/ 
gamma efficiency ratio, evaluated at 4.5 +0.5 in 1966 
(calculation 3) and then fixed finally at 4 in I967 
(calculation 4); in this way it became possible to 
determine fairly precisely the organic consumption 
due to radiolysis in an ORGEL­type reactor, where the 
radiation spectrum is very different from that in 
1 an OMR . 
Fig. 9 shows how the estimated consumption cost 
changed with the years. It will be remarked that calcula­
tion No. 2 gives practically the same value as No. 4, but 
in I960 certain experts preferred method 1, which they 
considered more realistic (see "Organic Make­up Data", 
J. Scrivins, Nuclear Engineering, February I960, p. 63). 
It will also be noted that the error of evalua­
tion between calculations 1 and 4 is roughly $3·5 ' 10 for 
a 25Ο MWe ORGEL power plant operating for 20 years at 
7,000 h/year; this more or less represents the actual 
for research spending on this subject and it would there­
fore not have been reasonable to undertake the research 
without having in view the marketing of a whole series of 
reactors (e.g., 10,000 MWe), that is to say, if it was 
only to be regarded as worthwhile ­ and paid off ­ within 
the ORGEL context. 
1 
See p. 28, Section 7·2 
For a high­polymer level held at 30?¿ by means of one of 
the "physical" processes researched by Euratom, which 
does not alter the constituents of the fluid but removes 
certain compounds. "Chemical" processes altering the 
fluid constituents were studied in the USA (reducing the 
heavy compounds into substances of lower molecular weight 
by hydrocracking, and recycling the new fluid thus ob­
tained in the coolant circuit), but were never confirmed 
with a pilot plant, still less with a reactor· 
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2.5 Reactor physics 
2.5.1 Reactivity problems are particularly important 
in the field of heavy-water reactors, which 
have to be designed to allow the longest possible ir-
radiation of the unenriched fuel. An economic optimiza-
tion demands exact knowledge of how the reactivity balance 
varies with the geometrical characteristics of the lattices 
and with the evolution of the fuel. This knowledge cannot 
be obtained solely by theoretical paths, because the geom-
etry of a heavy-water reactor cell is very complex (fuel 
ele ent divided into "clusters" of a number of pins; pos-
sible presence of a calandria tube, a pressure tube, also 
of a coolant which absorbs and slows down at temperatures 
and/or is of a nature differing from the temperatures or 
nature of the moderator, and so forth). Consequently, 
numerous experimental plants were built very early in 
1 different countries . 
The 1959 knowhow appeared to be solidly estab-
lished in regard to fresh cold lattices moderated and 
cooled with heavy water and fuelled with metal uranium 
or uranium oxide in the form of plates, rods or, better 
still, clusters of "pins". For the last-named, the ZEEP, 
Aquilon and Zebra results provided the means of estab-
lishing codes fitted to the experiments which showed 
1 
in Canada: ZEEP (critical 1943), ZED (critical i960) 
in USA: SE (exponential 1956); PSE (exponential); 
PLATR (critical 1958); PDP (critical i960) 
PRCF (critical I962) 
in Sweden: Zebra (exponential 1955) 
in France: Aquilon (critical 1956), then Aquilon-2 
(critical i960) etc. 
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1 
good general agreement in a restricted range. The number 
of fuel-element geometries and the range of lattice pitches 
studied was too limited, however, to meet the full needs 
of the optimization studies (Geneva Conference, 1958; 
A/CONF 15, p. 336, France; Heavy-Water Lattices, IAEA, 
Vienna, i960). 
Under these conditions, the uncertainties in 
1959 basically concerned: 
a) the effect of using organic liquid instead of heavy 
water as the coolant; 
b) the trend of lattice parameter changes at temperatures 
over 80°C; 
c) the trend of lattice parameter changes with irradiation 
of the fuel, chiefly at high burn-ups; 
d) the effect that enrichment of the fuel would have; 
e) in 1962 these four uncertainties were, for ORGEL, 
joined by a fifth, when uranium carbide was chosen 
as the fuel. 
2.5.2 Uncertainty a) was cleared up very soon by the 
buckling measurements done under contract in 
Aquilon-1 in March i960 with a metal uranium fuel, and 
then in Aquilon-2 in June I96I with clusters of uranium 
oxide pins. The French correlation, adjusted to a heavy-
water coolant, could not justifiably have been applied 
directly to an organic coolant. As regards the nature of 
1 
For instance, the differences between the lattice 
buckling values studied on ZEEP and those calculate^ 
by the French code on Aquilon did not exceed 0.2 m 
76-
the fuel (uncertainty e)), Fig. 10 shows that the 
Caroline heavy-water/organic code (I962) adjusted to 
1 uranium oxide underestimated the reactivity of the 
carbide lattices as determined from the experiments 
2 conducted later on EXPO (1964), ZED-2 (I965) and ECO 
(1966), for it gave values which fell outside the 
experimental margins of error. 
Nevertheless the deviations are acceptable for 
feasibility and optimization studies; it can be con-
cluded therefrom that studies of types a) and b) on new, 
cold lattices are only justified for thermal reactors in 
special cases and where they do not cost very much. 
Thus, in the context of a specific development 
project, high capital investments such as ECO are not 
justifiable; the decision to build ECO was a consequence 
of the decision to fit out the Ispra Centre with ORGEL-4 slanted equipment . 
1 
The seven tonnes of uranium carbide needed for the 
physics experiments were not delivered until 1964, 
owing to the time required to develop and fabricate 
this new fuel. 
2 
p. 25, Section 6.2. 
3 
According to the IAEA Report "Heavy-Water Lattices", i960, the desirable margin of accuracy on the buckling 
values would be O.3 m for optimization studies and 
0.8 m for the feasibility studies. 
4 For the reasons that led up to the building of ECO, 
see p.25, Section 6.2. 
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2.5·3 As regards the elucidation of the unknowns 
of types b) and c) in the ORGEL context, a 
multi-channel loop which can be used for lattice studies 
with organic temperatures up to 300°C came into opera-
tion in 1969 just when the programme was closed down; 
these studies are to be pursued, however, since they 
are of general interest. Here, too, the future will show 
whether the gap between the calculated and the experi-
mental values is really significant. 
2.6 Safety 
2.6;1 The use of an organic coolant substantially 
reduces the hazards connected with activation 
of the coolant or cladding failures. Activation is due 
solely to the impurities, which are kept at a very low 
level for other reasons (p. 70, Section 2.4); hence it 
is negligible, thus greatly facilitating maintenance 
work, as was confirmed by OMRE, Piqua and WR-1 operating 
experience. As to cladding ruptures, a crust of polymer-
ized organic forms and stops up the cracks, as was seen 
in the Canadian irradiation experiments, so that they 
have only limited, slowly-developing consequences and 
the necessary action can be taken without haste. 
On the other hand, the use of an organic coolant 
demands certain precautions, which were revealed or spec-
ified after 1959; at that time, the major unknown factors 
were : 
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a) the toxicity of the coolant; 
b) the hazards of fire and explosion of the organic 
dust, liquid and vapour. 
To these must be added two hazards linked 
with both the reactor structure (pressure tubes) and 
the organic coolant: 
c) the risk of a reactivity insertion too rapid to 
be controllable, as a result of accidental dumping 
of the coolant out of the core (rupture of primary 
circuit); 
d) the possibility of chain rupture of the channel tubes 
that traverse the reactor, initiated by accidental 
failure of one of them. 
The 1959 knowhow came from operating experience 
with the OMRE reactor during the previous year and from 
the preliminary studies done on that type of reactor; 
hence it only related to points a) and b). The intro-
ductory report on a I50 MWe OMR power plant, prepared in 
1 1959 by Atomics International , concluded that the coolant 
could only catch fire in the presence of an igniting agent 
(electric arc, spark) and that the few fires resulting from 
work on OMRE had been extinguished quite easily with carbon 
dioxide. Under normal reactor operating conditions, the 
usual industrial fire precautions ought to suffice; there 
2 was no question of risk of an explosion, other than that 
of a cloud of solid organic dust, which was considered un-
likely to occur provided that certain precautions were 
taken. 
1 Very similar to the one submitted by Atomics International 
for KBWP (AKS power plant) (p.28, Section 7.2). 
2 
Leaving out of account the danger represented by the accu-
mulation of highly combustible gases (produced by coolant 
radiolysis) in certain tanks of the degassing system. This 
hazard was eliminated by using a nitrogen cover gas, a pro-
cedure followed by all subsequent designers. 
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In regard of toxicity, the same report described 
the diphenyl and terphenyl as pharmaceutical^ inert, to 
the extent that workers needed no mask or special clothing. 
Nevertheless it recommended that for continuous work, the 
diphenyl vapour concentration in the air should not exceed 
0.2 ppm. 
All this information shed no light on uncertainties 
c) and d), of course, since these had nothing to do with an 
organic cooled and organic-moderated reactor. 
2.6.2 The last uncertainty, d), was the first to be 
tackled, ov/ing to the seriousness of the poten-
tial accident and the lack of knowledge at that time re-
garding the reliability of the SAP channels. 
Experiments were run on a rig constructed for 
the purpose, which reproduced in full scale the experi-
mental zone of the ESSOR core, assumed to be loaded with 
SAP channels. 
The first set of tests investigated the be-
haviour of the calandria tube; the SAP pressure tube 
was artificially weakened along a generatrix over a 
length of about 1.5 m and the organic liquid was in-
jected at the maximum temperature and pressure pre-
scribed for a prototype ORGEL reactor (425 C, 30 atm.abs). 
In the first tens of seconds following the rupture of the 
SAP tube, stresses distinctly higher than the normal werking 
stresses appeared in the Zircaloy tube; nevertheless the 
The toxicological data and industrial experience, however, 
essentially concerned diphenyl and certain of its compounds 
used as industrial fluids. 
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latter not only never ruptured, but did not even exhibit 
1 any plastic deformation . It was therefore considered 
to be highly unlikely that the rupture of a pressure 
tube would be followed by that of a calandria tube. 
Nonetheless, a second set of tests was carried 
out to investigate the behaviour of the channels and 
control rods adjacent to a bursting channel, and to 
study the pressure waves in the reactor vessel; for this 
purpose the calandria and pressure tubes of one channel 
were artificially weakened. No shock waves were observed 
in the vessel, and no rupture or dangerous deformation of 
the adjacent channels. When a fuel element was included in 
the weakened channel, there was no projection of missiles. 
These results were very reassuring and argued 
strongly in favour of organic cooling in a pressure-tube 
reactor, and uncertainty d) was regarded as solved after 
some four years' work. 
2.6.3 Uncertainty c) concerned the reactor control 
system: accidental draining of th.? organic 
liquid fro:.; t" e core led to a reactivity insertion of 
some thousands of milliniles in a time which the most 
pessimistic calculations assessed as two or three tenths 
of a second. It was thus to be feared that the safety 
rods would not work fast enough. This uncertainty was 
solved by theoretical and experimental studies of the 
draining mechanisms, and also by developing fast-insertion 
safety rods using poisoned liquid« 
1 
This result was very important, because it provided 
grounds for assuming that an irradiated, and therefore 
more brittle, calandria tube would likewise have a 
considerable margin of safety with regard to the ac-
cident in question. 
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2.6.4 The fire and explosion hazards vary according 
to the nature of the organic coolant, its 
physical state (solid, liquid, vapour), its temperature, 
its pressure and the nature of the gaseous medium sur­
rounding it. 
2.6.4.1 In the solid state, an explosion may occur: a 
leak of hot coolant through a small hole acting 
as an atomizer may create a cloud of solid particles in 
suspension in the atmosphere. If, in a certain region of 
the cloud, the organic concentration exceeds one­tenth 
of a gram per litre, an explosion is liable to occur in 
that region if a sufficiently "hot" spark (over 600 C) 
is present. Nevertheless, since a leak of the type 
described above is quickly detectable and involves 
only small quantities of organic, this type of explo­
sion cannot be regarded as a major risk. 
2.6.4.2 ■ In the liquid state, a fire may break out: 
spontaneous combustion resulting from a leak 
through a pipe­burst is ruled out, since the maximum 
envisageable temperature for an organic coolant (about 
400 C) is generally far below the temperature for 
self­ignition at atmospheric pressure. Spontaneous 
This is always the case with the OM­2 type of 
non­hydrogenated organic coolants, for which 
the self­ignition temperatures are 500­600 C. 
In the case of pure hydrogenated coolants of 
the HB­40 type, the self­ignition temperature 
decreases with the percentage of hydrogénation, 
down to values below 400°C (Fig. 11). The coolant 
temperature must therefore be limited accordingly. 
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ignition is also ruled out inside the circuits on 
account of the nitrogen cover gas, although at their 
pressure value the self-ignition temperature may be 
in the vicinity of the coolant temperature. 
A fire can only be caused by a big leak of 
coolant at the operating temperatures, in an atmosphere 
not rendered inert and in the presence of a source of 
ignition. This danger is reduced, where the reactor 
block is concerned, by filling or sweeping with nitro­
gen and as regards the organic circuit rooms, by a 
temporary or permanent oxygen depletion (a few percent). 
The electrical material is in both cases explosion-proof, 
In addition to these safeguards there is general 
provision for a fire-fighting system, which reduces the 
consequences of any accident. 
2.6.4.3 In the vapour state, there is a risk of fire 
and explosion. A major escape of coolant to 
the atmosphere can lead to instant vaporization or slow 
evaporation of the escaped coolant, depending on the 
conditions o In either case, if a certain volume of the 
cloud reaches an organic-vapour concentration lying 
within a certain range (0.48 - 3·7Λ> for ON-2 vapour in 
air), both fire and explosion may occur if a source 
(electrostatic discharge, electric arc, etc.) is present. 
This hazard can be countered, as shown in Section 2.6.4.2, 
p. 81, by creating an inert atmosphere in the vulnerable 
places and using explosion-proof fittings. 
Under these conditions a decision to take into 
account a major accident due to an explosion of organic 
vapour depends on the view of the safety experts regarding 
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the probability of the following events occurring 
simultaneously : 
i) accidental flashing of an ignition source; 
ii) malfunctioning of the alarm, fire-fighting, 
inerting, etc., systems; 
and on the intrinsic uncertainty as to whether there is a 
significant volume of organic vapour at a dangereous con-
centration surrounding the flash-point. 
Although this accident was not regarded as credible 
-ï 
for the Piqua, EOCR and WR-1 reactors , its potential sever-
•x 2 » 
lty for a power reactor and its heavy incidence on the costs 
of the leaktight containment led to its being taken into con-
3 sideration for the HWOCR project and for the ORGEL prototype 
competition. 
A study v/as launched under contract, to clear up 
the uncertainty mentioned above. Organic vapours were to be 
injected into an enclosed space of 100 m , the conditions 
governing their ignition were to be studied, and the pressure 
rise in the enclosure to be recorded. The study was stopped 
at the same time as the ORGEL programme and no light has 
been thrown on the subject since then. 
2.6.5 Toxicity of organic coolants 
Although the American studies carried out in con-
nection with OMRE produced the conclusion that the 
toxicity of diphenyl (and terphenyl) is very low, the question 
of the toxicity of organic coolants came up again when work 
started on the experimental organic rigs for the ORGEL programme, 
It was considered credible for ESSOR. The decision was then 
taken to render the upper and lower reactor rooms inert with 
nitrogen and to carry out the explosion effects study in the 
bunkers of the experimental organic circuits. This study shows 
that the bunkers withstand the accident envisaged. 
2 In particular as regards the release of fission products if 
the leaktight containment bursts. 
5 Heavy Water Organic-Cooled Reactor; name of the American 
project. 
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Research to clear this uncertainty was started for two 
reasons: the first, of a psychological nature, was the dif-
ficulty of establishing convincing safety standards for the 
staff on the basis of experiments c.nducted elsewhere; the 
second related to the use in the various test circuits of 
1 
different organic mixtures (p. 61, Section 1.3*3) the tox-
icology of which had not been studied. 
Special attention was paid to the possible con-
sequences of chronic inhalation of organic vapours; a ro-
tating chamber enabling 48 rats to be exposed simultaneous-
ly was used to study this question. 
The conclusions, based on animal studies, viere 
as follows: 
i) The chemical toxicity of all the commercial poly-
phenyl mixtures tested depends essentially on the 
toxicity of the individual components and their 
relative concentration in the mixture. 
ii) All mixtures, except HB-40, are slightly toxic 
after chronic inhalation at high doses; to do 
any harm, over 20 g terphenyl a day would have 
to be absorbed over an appreciable period. HB-40 
is practically non-toxic after ingestion. 
1 The mixtures tested viere : OM-2 (Progil, France), 
DOM (Monsanto, USA), both containing diphenyl and 
isomers of terphenyl, HB-40 (Monsanto, USA), con-
taining hydrogenated compounds, Thermip (ESSO, 
France) and Solvent 200 (ESSO, France), both of 
them petroleum distillation cuts composed of di-
phenyls and alkylnaphthalenes in varying propor-
tions. 
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iii) OM-2 and DOM are moderately toxic; HB-40, 
Thermip and Solvent 200 are slightly toxic 
after chronic inhalation of strong concen-
trations in the atmosphere, causing, very 
particularly, receptivity to infections of 
the respiratory passages. 
iv) All the mixtures are virtually non-toxic 
for intact skin and slightly toxic for 
open wounds. 
It must be remarked that these conclusions refer 
to mixtures of commercial coolants which have not been al-
tered through operation in the reactor; their toxicity 
under operating conditions thus remains to be defined. 
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APPENDIX 1 
ESSOR, which is equipped for testing heavy-water 
reactor subassemblies in a representative environment, has 
a core moderated entirely with heavy water. A ring of cy-
1 lindrical enriched-uranium fuel elements of the MTR-type, 
cooled by a special heavy-water circuit, provides the neutron 
flux for the zone inside this ring, where there are twelve 
experimental sites able to receive channels passing verti-
cally right through the reactor vessel. These channels, 
surrounded by heavy water, can have various coolants flow-
ing through them; thus ESSOR reproduces the real environment 
found in a heavy-water power reactor. The unperturbed mean 
thermal neutron flux in the irradiation zone is of the order 
14 2 
of 3 · 10 neutrons/cm sec. In connection with the develop-
ment of the ORGEL Project, three organic loops were built, 
two serving a single experimental channel and a third (called 
the MK-5 multiple loop) designed to cool a cluster of 5-8 
channels. 
Another experimental site at present contains a 
channel assembly for the Italian Cirene programme (heavy-
water moderated, boiling light-water cooled reactor). 
The ESSOR complex also comprises a storage pond 
for active components and two high-activity laboratories: 
in one, irradiated fuel elements are studied and in the 
other, large-scale devices such as channels eight metres 
high. 
1 The fuel elements, known as "feeders", are mounted 
in thimble circuits. 
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Thus, with its large available volume under 
flux, and backed up by its adjoining laboratories, the 
ESSOR complex is a really convenient tool for irradiating 
fuel-scale channels and fuel elements for the heavy-water 
reactor types and for studies of such components after 
irradiation. 
91 -
APPENDIX 2 
The Scientific and Technical Committee having been 
consulted at its meeting of 28 April 1959, the Commission 
submitted a communication concerning its programme to the 
Council (Journal Officiel of 6 June 1959, pp. 664-665/59), 
which included the following text: 
"Energy Applications 
"The Commission's programme must, as far as possible, 
complement the national programmes. Furthermore, the sums al-
located under Annex V of the Treaty for the first five years 
(sums of only the same order of magnitude as France's annual 
nuclear budget) permit only a limited effort. 
"The Community has no access to enriched uranium on 
economic terms, apart from what it can procure under the 
1 Euratom-US agreement . 
"Certain choices therefore have to be made. 
" The graphite/natural uranium reactor system forms 
the basis of vigorous programmes being run by France. The 
United Kingdom, with which the Commission has an agreement 
for cooperation, uses this system and Italy is also working 
on it. 
"With due regard to the Community's own resources, 
the basic system must use natural uranium and the natural 
uranium/heavy water system is the best choice. 
The reactors built under the Euratom-US programme 
totalling 1,000 MW) will give the Community's 
industrial firms experience in the use of enriched 
uranium; and the Commission's share in the relevant 
research and development programme amounts, in five 
years, to 50 million dollars. 
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"In order to define the Commission's course of 
action more clearly, it is necessary to bear in mind that: 
a) heat extraction by pressurized heavy water in pressure 
tubes is under study in Canada and Germany is doing 
research on these lines; 
b) France is designing a prototype heavy-water reactor 
cooled with pressurized gas (EL-4). 
"Hence it appears that the Commission must study 
extra carefully the natural uranium/heavy water variant 
cooled with organic liquid. 
"Furthermore, organic-cooled reactors qualify to 
come under the Euratom-US agreement, and the studies re-
lating thereto can be carried out in the joint research 
programme covered by that agreement. 
"Moreover, owing to the European shortage of uranium-
235, it is important for the Community to use artificial fis-
sile elements or isotopes (uranium-233 and plutonium). The 
Commission has therefore included in its programme research 
on fast plutonium reactors in preparation for the breeder 
system (though not overlooking the promise offered by the 
use of the thorium/uranium-233 chain). It will likewise 
study.the possibility of re-using plutonium in slow neutron 
1 reactors . 
"Lastly, the Commission must coordinate the marine 
propulsion reactor projects currently envisaged in the 
Community (in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). 
The Commission's effort might extend to the development 
of a prototype on land. 
1 
In the field of uranium enrichment, however, original 
methods are being studied in the hope of devising a 
more economic process than diffusion. The Commission 
has no intention of disregarding these methods. 
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"In view of the manpower and money demanded by 
this prototype programme, it must be the pivot around 
which the Commission's priority research schemes will 
develop. Nevertheless the Commission will not system-
atically refuse to consider any other line of research 
and will, in particular, consider to what extent it can 
assist the national programme." 
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APPENDLX 3 
The core of the ORGEL Project organization 
consisted of a small number of engineers responsible 
for special questions (Messrs A. Bahbout, N. Cadelli, 
F. Lafontaine), a Project Design Studies office headed 
by Mr J.C. Charrault, and an office responsible for 
constructing the ESSOR complex, of which Mr C. Garric 
was the director and Mr G. Hess the deputy director. 
The ESSOR Operating Division is directed by 
Mr P. Bonnaure, with Mr W. Kranert as his principal 
assistant. 
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Γ/<*. %7 Q _ Development with time of the estimate 
of the hourly radiolytic decomposition 
of the organic coolant, for various reactors 
FIG. S t . Development with time of the estimate of 
the cost of replacing organic coolant 
destroyed by radiolysis, for a 250 MWe 
ORGEL reactor 
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Progress of the assessment of buckling of an organic/heavy water lattice 
with cluster-type of fuel element containing seven UC pins 
(rod diameter 25.2 mm; lattice pitch 240 mm) 
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φ One benzene nucleus 
■ Two benzene nuclei 
A Three benzene nuclei 
+ Four benzene nuclei 
1. Benzene 
2. Naphthalene 
3­ Diphenyl 
4. the three terphenyl isomers 
5. toluene 
6. the tetraphenyl isomers 
7. p­cyclohexane diphenyl 
8. tetra­hydro­naphthalene 
9. phenylcyclohexane 
10. cyclohexane 
11. dicyclohexane 
\ ■ 9 \ 
\ \ 
\ \ 
\ \ 
\ \ 
\ \ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
■ 1o 
\ 
11. \ 
\ \ 
\ 
hydrogenati on 
Variation of sol f­ignit i­on ppint of certain aromatic 
derivatives vs the percentage of hydrogénation (from 
Geiss and Kuhlbörsch) 
The self­ignition point falls when the hydrogénation 
percentage rises; most of the hydrogenated derivaties 
considered were detected by analysis in either 0M2 or HB40 
after irradiation. 
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